Chapter
III
BATTLES AND DIPLOMACY DURING THE WAR
The Danubian Front in 1853
…However, on 6
October 1853, Paskevich recommended to Nikolai that he take a defensive
position without crossing the Danube. Then, in
contradiction to this defensive posture, he added that Russia had a powerful weapon against the Ottoman Empire in its influence on Ottoman Christians.
Therefore Russia
could take advantage of a Christian revolt against the “Mussulman yoke”.
Paskevich, knowing well Nikolai’s dislike of any revolutionary movements
against any “legitimate” monarch, added that this was not a “revolutionary”
call to insubordination to a sovereign, but a rightful cause, because Russia could
not remain indifferent to the suffering of Orthodox Christians under Ottoman
rule. Thus, while the Russian armies would remain behind the Danube, an Ottoman
Christian revolt against the Sultan was expected to happen in some fashion,
despite the obvious hostility of Austria toward any such revolt.
Did Paskevich
really believe what he recommended to Nikolai? It seems doubtful. Paskevich
might have simply wanted to please Nikolai I, who therefore had not been well
disposed towards Slavophiles at all, but now thought that the Slavs could be at
use. Paskevich also did not want to move his second army corps from Poland – nether to the Danube, nor later to
Crimea – observing the danger of an intervention by Austria. One month later, Paskevich
developed his cautions attitude further and recommended maintaining defenses in
“Europe” to avoid angering the great powers.
He argued that even if Russia
were to take Edirne,
the great powers would interfere and would not permit them to benefit from
their conquests. The Russians would suffer many losses from disease ant not
gain much even if they were victorious. According to him, time was on the side
of Russia;
it was necessary to wait. Thus he recommended a defensive position on the
Danube, but an offensive one in the Caucasus. He
suggested that with 16 battalions now in the Russian Caucasus army, it was
possible to act offensively, because there the great powers could not interfere
and the Russian army could easily beat the Ottoman army when it stood alone.
The Russian
occupation army in the Danubian principalities numbered about 88,000 in October
1853. The headquarters of this army was in Bucharest. The Commander-in-Chief General
Mikhail Dimitrievich Gorchakov, having serve twenty-two years as Paskevich’s
chief of staff in Warsaw, was used to receiving orders and was not noted for
resolution and initiative. According to Tarle, from Gorchakov’s army only a
small portion (about a 10,000 men under the command of General Count Anrep) was
given the vanguard position to guard against the Ottoman forces until February
1854.
Taking the events
of the 1828-1829 Russo-Ottoman War into consideration, Omer Pasha had
concentrated a considerable force around Vidin,
the westernmost fortress on the Danube. The
importance of Vidin also derived from its
proximity to Serbia.
However, Russia wished to
avoid arousing suspicions of Austria
by being too close to the Serbians, and hence did not concentrate troops there.
On 28 October,
Ferik Ismail Pasha’s forces crossed Danube from Vidin
and occupied the small town of Kalafat
with a force of 12,000. The small Russian force in Kalafat retreated. On 30
October Omer Pasha himself came to Tutrakan, in the middle of the Danube front. An Ottoman infantry battalion with six guns
under the command of Kaimmakam Huseyin Bey crossed the Danube on 2 November and
occupied the quarantine house in Wallachia at the village of Oltenitsa.
These forces were reinforced by another battalion the next day and some
earthwork were built there.
On the Russian
side, Gorchakov’s characteristic indecision had passed from him to his generals
in command of various positions on the Danube.
Thus General Pyotr Dannenberg, commanding the forces in Little Wallachia, had
given orders to his force to the effect that if the “Turks” crossed the Danube, they should not engage in battle with them but
should not let them proceed farther. General Pavlov at Oltenitsa, on the left
hand (north) side of the Danube was at a loss
to understand this order. How could he not engage in war and at the same time
not let them passed? When the Ottomans started crossing the Danube
at the beginning of November, Dannenberg at first did not believe that it was a
serious affair. He was soon proved wrong.
On Friday 4,
November 1853, Russian forces commanded by General Pavlov attacked the
fortified Ottoman positions in Oltenitsa. The Russian forces were met with a
powerful cannonade from the Ottoman positions. Russian and Ottoman sources give
different numbers for the strength of both sides, each side arguing that the
enemy troops were more numerous. Omer Pasha’s report after the battle and the
official chronicler Lutfi Efendi maintan that a few Ottoman battalions fought
against 20 infantry battalions and 4 cavalry regiments. Omer Pasha’s report
states that, at the quarantine house, the Ottoman forces consisted of 3
companies of infantry, 2 companies of rifles or chasseurs (seshaneci), 150
cavalrymen and 6 guns, while the Russians attacked with 20 battalions of
infantry, 4 battalions of cavalry and 32 guns. On the other hand, the Russian
Generals Petrov and Kovalevskiy, participants in the Danubian campaign, and the
Soviet historian Tarle, argue that only one Russian brigade (2 infantry
regiments consisting of 4 battalions each, and 9 cavalry squadrons) attacked
the Ottoman forces, which in turn amounted to 8,000 men with 20 cannons.
In any case, on
that day the Ottomans had their first serious victory on the Danube.
The Russian force retreated. E. H. Nolan stated that the Cossacks ‘suffered
considerably from the rifle carbine of the Turks, a weapon superior to any
which their assailants used”. However, the Ottoman army did not pursue the
enemy. Omar Pasha was content with having won the battle. According to him,
Russian loses were more than 2,000 while the Ottomans lost 30 dead and 150
wounded. Lutfi Efendi however, writes that this battle is called the battle of Catana.
He has probably confused the battle of Oltenitsa with the battle of Catana.
Omer Pasha had remained in Tutrakan during the together with some foreign
officers, including the Spanish General Prim.
According to
General Yegor Petrovich Kovalevsky (1809 – 1868), Russian losses amounted to
236 dead and 734 wounded. Russian sources in general argue that the defeat was
due to the untimely or unnecessary order to retreat given by General Dannenberg
to General Pavlov. However, General Gorchakov endorsed the decision of
Dannenberg, for which he too has been criticized. Although this battle was not
important from a military-technical point of view, the European press
exaggerated it as a great Turkish” success. However small a battle it might
have been, Russian pride was certainly strung, and Ottoman confidence
increased.
The Battle of Sinop and
European Public Opinion
…The Porte
decided to send line-of-battle ships to the Black Sea,
but when the ships were ready to sail, the order was cancelled. The grand
admiral said it was the desire of the British ambassador. It was indeed the
desire of the British and French ambassadors, both of whom sent their dragomans
to the Porte on 4 November, warning the Porte of the danger of sending the
fleet, until their vessels had fully gathered in the Bosphorus and even after
that. The French ambassador, in his written instructions to his dragoman,
stated to Reshid Pasha his readiness to bring the rest of the French fleet to
the Bosphorus. But the ambassador also expressed his surprise of the decision
of the Porte to send to the Ottoman fleet to the Black Sea.
He wrote that this measure seemed untimely to him, because he expected the
Kapudan Pasha to concert his activities with the admirals of the allied fleets,
before taking the action.
Lord Stratford
de Redcliffe, on the same day, also expressed his readiness to bring the rest
of the British fleet to the Bosphorus, as it was decided together with M. de la
Cour. He wrote that they were impressed by the “courage et de l’esprit de patriotisme” manifested by the Ottoman
ministers by sending their fleet into the Black Sea,
except for the three-deckers. However, he observed that the opinions of both
the British and French experts were against this enterprise because of the
advanced season and the great danger from the large Russian fleet in Sevastopol. It would be
imprudent to risk such a large part of the Ottoman fleet, and a failure at this
moment would cause a number of problems for the Porte. He argued that in any
case it would be “une folie” to send
the Ottoman fleet before the allied fleet arrived in full in the Bosphorus. He
further commented that according to the opinion of the allied admirals, even
after the arrival of the allied fleets, three or four of the steamships should
be sent instead of sailing ships on the line. He concluded that if the Porte
decided to send sail or steam ships to the Black Sea, it should wait until the
appearance of the full moon that would diminish the navigational hazards of the
Black Sea in November.
On 5 of
November, the day of departure of the light squadron of the Osman Pasha and
Huseyin Pasha, the French ambassador sent another warning to the Porte of the
serious disadvantages of sending the fleet and advised the Porte to defer it.
On the same day Lord Stratford de Redcliffre wrote to the Lord Clarendon that
he had “succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of
line-of-battle ships and frigates into the Black Sea
at this moment”.
Sometime later,
when the parliamentary papers (the Blue Books) were published, Slade asked the
ambassador why he had prevented the sending of line-of-battle ships to Sinop. Stratford replied that he
had relied on the opinion of men unacquainted with the local conditions; he
said that their rank and position given by their governments left him no
choice. Lord Clarendon from London
on 21 November also approved the decision of the Admiral Dundas and his
Excellency the ambassador, adding that the Porte would do better on relying on
the authority of the British and French admirals.
Five years
later, in a letter to the grand vizier Ali Pasha, Slade wrote that at the
beginning of the war, when Mahmud pasha ordered him to cruise with a squadron
in the Black Sea, Lord Stratford had ordered him on the behalf of the Queen to
remain in the Bosphorus. Because Britain
was at peace with Russia,
his presence in the Black Sea could compromise
her. Slade replied that the Ottoman navy relied on the cooperation with Britain and if
he did not go, this might have an inappropriate meaning. According to Slade,
“His Excellency than threatened to submit a compliant against me to the British
government: that he did”. Slade also wrote that “on other occasions during the
war my views of my duty to the Sublime Porte led me to opposition to the
allies”. [aut. tr.]
Stratford de
Redcliffe’s motives are open to a double interpretation. Those who believe that
he wanted to accelerate the war suggest that he deliberately left the Ottoman
squadron to destruction in order to involve Britain
in the war against Russia.
Those who are in the opinion that he had most peaceful intentions can argue
that he wanted to prevent a possible collision between the Ottoman and Russian
fleets. As an alternative to these views, we can argue that he simply followed
the advice of the admirals, without hidden agenda. But in any case it is
difficult to understand the logic of not-sending line-of-battle ships in this
case. If the danger presented by the Russian fleet was real, it would seem that
dispatching a light fleet consisting only of frigates and corvettes, rather
than a fleet consisting of line-of-battle ships and frigates, would only
increase what was at risk. Would it not make more sense to advise not sending
any ships at all, or instead to send stronger support? Did Stratford and the admirals think that since
the Porte was so determined, and destruction was in any case imminent, that at
least line-of-battle ships should be saved? It is hard to come to a conclusion.
That the prevent
of the line-of-battle ships being sent to the Black Sea was the expressed
desire of the allied admirals is also confirmed by Madmud Pasha in his evidence
at his trial after the disaster of Sinop and his dismissal from his post.
In mid-November,
Bahriye Feriki Mistafa Pasha with his flotilla returned from Batum and saw the
position of Patrona Osman Pasha Riyale Huseyin Pasha’s flotilla at Sinop, which
is closer to Sevastopol than to Istanbul. The Ottoman squadron in Sinop
consisted of seven frigates: Avnillah
(Osman Pasha’s flagship, 50 guns), Nizamye
(second-flag, commanded by Riyale {Mirliva} Huseyin Pasha, 64 guns), Nesim-i-Zafer (48 guns), Fazlullah (the former Russian frigate Rafail, captured in 1829, 48 guns), Navek-i-Bahri (42 guns) Dimiyat (42 guns) amd Kaid-i Zafer (22 guns), three corvettes
(Necm-i Efsan, Fevz-i Mabud and Gul-i Sefid,
22 guns each) ant two transports. They had encountered gales in transit and
lost each other, only arriving at the Sinop harbor with great difficulty.
Mustafa Pasha also saw the danger of this flotilla being exposed to a Russian
attack, but he did not take any measures to prevent it. He left a further two
steamers (the Taif and the Eregli) at Sinop and on 24 November came
to Istanbul,
where he reported the vulnerable position of the squadron and the insufficiency
of the shore batteries of Sinop. Adolphus Slade interprets his conduct as a
result of caution and fear of reprobation from the authorities and enemies or
rivals in Istanbul
in case the Russians did not attack. It is true that every pasha had enemies in
Istanbul, ready
to agitate against him at first opportunity. While at that time many of the
Ottoman pashas in general had more cunning than merit, it was also true that
working under a weak government open to all kind of influence was not an easy
task either. This uncertainty prevented them from taking any initiative.
On the Russian
side, Prince Menshikov was still the minister of marine and was now also the
commander-in-chief of all the land and naval forces in the Crimea.
At the beginning of the war, the Russian Black Sea fleet was divided into two
squadrons or divisions, commanded by two talented and prominent admirals,
Chief-of-Staff vice-admiral Vladimir Alekseyevich Kornilov (1806 – 1854) and
Vice-Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov (1802 – 1855), both of them pupils of
Admiral Lazarev (1788 – 1851). Nakhimov cruised eastern part of the Black Sea from Sinop to Sohum, and Kornilov cruised the
Western part of it. Nakhimov’s first duty was to transport the Russian 13th
division (16,393 person, 824 horses and their load) from Sevastopol
to Fort Anakra at the mouth of the river Ingur,
and he completed it successfully in September 1853.
Kornilov for his
part came as close as the northern part of the Bosphorus at the beginning of
November. Menshikov had given him instructions to engage in battle with the
Ottoman warships. Kornilov cruised the western coasts of the Black Sea from
Balchik, Varna
and Sizepol to Burgaz and he did not meet Ottoman battle ships. Finally, he
sent back most of his squadron to Sevastopol and
himself remained on the steam frigate Vladimir. At
that time, the Ottoman-Egyptian steamer Pervaz-i Bahri was sent to Eregli for a
coal. On its way, it fell in with the Vladimir on 17
November 1853. In the battle that followed, the Vladimir
captured the Pervaz-i Bahri, which lost 22 dead including the Egyptian captain
Said Pasha and 18 wounded men and officers. The Russians lost two dead and two
wounded; one of the dead was Lieutenant Zheleznov, Kornilov’s aide-de-camp. The
Russians returned to Sevastopol
with their booty, which was renamed Kornilov.
This small affair can be considered as the first battle in history between
steamships.
From 23 November
onwards, Osman Pasha knew that a Russian squadron of three line-of-battle ships
(three-deckers), two brigs and one steamer was nearby. However, he did not
choose to accept battle in the open sea and remained instead in port. According
to the report, of Captain Yahia Bey and other officers of the Taif, submitted after it escaped the
enemy and came to Istanbul,
the Patrona Pasha gave the following instructions to all the captains:
The enemy’s ships are at sea and we cannot cope with
them. If we put out to sea, we will be lost; the best thing is to fight them,
if they come, so long as we have a gun left. If there be any danger of their
capturing you, slip your cable, run your ships on shore and let fire to them.
As this squadron
was not particularly powerful, Osman Pasha could have engage it, or at least
attempted a running fight towards Istanbul.
However, he instead sent an alarming report on 24 of November to Istanbul asking for
immediate help. Meanwhile, Admiral Nakhimov sent for reinforcement from Sevastopol. Prince
Menshikov sent out another squadron of three galleons and two frigates under
the command of Rear-Admiral Fyodor Mihailovich Novosilskiy. Resid Pasha in Istanbul informed the
British and French embassies on 29 and 30 November, just before and on the day
of the faithful battle, that a Russian squadron was cruising the waters of
Sinop, Amasra and Bartin. The ambassadors consulted their respective admirals
in the Bosphorus and decided that it would not be recommended to send their
fleets into the Black Sea. In any case, they
did not hurry to answer. The Ottoman Admiralty had also sent some warnings to
Osman Pasha just prior to the faithful battle. We shall review these letters
after the battle, together with the case against Mahmud Pasha.
On 27 November
the squadron of Novosilskiy joined Nakhimov’s squadron. Now Nakhimov’s power
was more than sufficient to destroy the Ottoman squadron, which was still at
anchor at the bay
of Sinop. On the morning
of 30 November, Nakhimov gave the order to attack to his squadron consisting
now of six battleships: Imperatritsa
Mariya (flagship, 84 guns), Parizh
(2nd flag, 120), Tri
Svyatitelya (120), Velikiy Knyaz
Konstantin (120), Rostislav (84),
Chesma (84), two frigates Kagul and Kulevchi and three steamers (Odessa,
Krym and Khersones). These ships were certainly equipped with more guns with
greater caliber than those possessed by Ottomans. The largest Ottoman guns were
24-pounders, while the Russians had 68-pounders. Furthermore, the Russians
ships had 30 Paixhans guns that used explosive shells. These shells penetrated
deep inside the wooden planking of the Ottoman ships, exploding there and
igniting the hulls. Although the Paixhans guns had been used before, hitherto
they were clumsy and dangerous to use on board ships. The Russian navy had
developed advanced design with a far greater explosive capacity and destructive
force than previously available, which were used to sink almost all the ships
in the bay of Sinop. Cannon fire had sunk ships
before, but the staggering effect of the explosive shells now surprised the
entire world.
Although the
Ottoman forces could make use of the shore batteries as well, the position of
the Ottoman squadron did not allow a full use of them because, owing to a
short-sighted disposition, the filed of fire of some of the batteries was
blocked by the squadron. In any case, these batteries were of small caliber
firing shots of 14 to 19 pounds. It is also not clear why Osman Pasha did not
use the guns on the other side of his ships (which could not be brought to bear
on the attackers) as shore batteries. Zayonchovskiy also argues that the
Ottoman squadron could have shown better resistance if it had taken up a
position not near the city, but to the south. Taking into consideration that
Osman Pasha was an experienced sailor and a good admiral, Zayonchovskiy can
find no explanation for his carelessness other than senility or the effects of
the British delusion that the Russians could not attack fortified positions.
Osman Pasha’s
squadron was lying on crescent form in the bay. The Russian squadron entered in
two columns and demanded the surrender of the Ottoman squadron. Osman Pasha
refused to surrender but vacillated about firing first. The Russians ships
anchored about 900 meters from the Ottoman squadron. The signal of Navek-i
Bahri for leave to fire was disregarded. Then the Nizamiye first opened fire and the others followed it. There began
a devastating combat or rather cannonade between unequal forces. At first, the
Ottoman guns inflicted severe damage on the Russians ships during their
maneuvering. However, soon the Russian ships took position and after a while
started to make good hits. Then the destructive effects of the explosive shells
from the 68-pound guns became clear. The Ottoman ships were burnt and blown up
in a few hours (estimate range from one to six hours).
Adolphus Slade
the Mushaver Pasha was on the board the Taif.
At the approach of the Russian ships, he took advantage of the high speed of
this steamship and fled the battle-scene. Nakhimov had already ordered the Kagul and Kulevchi to look after the Taif,
but they could not overtake it. The Taif had fired some shots and then turned first
towards Gerze to the east, then set course to Istanbul.
At this time,
Admiral Kornilov had arrived with his reinforcements and, seeing the escape
attempt of the Taif, he tried to
capture it, but it managed to get away thanks to its superior speed. Kornilov
was late; Nakhimov had already devastated the whole squadron except Taif. However, Nakhimov did not cease
fire even after all the ships were burning. The Muslim quarters of the city
were also set ablaze and since the governor and the Muslim population had fled,
there was no one to extinguish the fires. Because of this conduct, Nakhimov was
later criticized for hitting civilian targets; he defended himself by this was
a result of the Ottoman fleet’s position. After the bombardment stopped,
Nakhimov sent an envoy to the city, but the envoy could find no authorities or
consuls. The only resident consul, the Austrian consul, had also fled. The
envoy gave to the consulate Nakhimov’s explanation that he did not intend to
harm the city, but had come to destroy the Ottoman squadron which carried
ammunition to Circassian insurgents.
According to
Slade, Ottoman losses were about 2,700 dead out of 4,200 personnel of the squadron.
However, this figure seems rather exaggerated for the capacity of the eleven
ships that were present. According to the written statement of naval commander
(Miralay) Mehmed Bey, who was a secretary of the commander at that time, given
in report in 1891 to the chronicler Lufti Efendi, the number of naval personnel
in Sinop was 2,989 men and dead included Bozcaadali Riyale Huseyin Pasha,
together with 56 officers, and more than 1,000 men, while Patrona Osman Pasha
together with 4 officers and some men was taken prisoner. Out of this number
(2,989), only 958 men and officers turned up in Istanbul after the battle. More sailors from
Egyptian frigates had survived, probably because they swam well, while those
sailors recruited from Anatolia did not.
{THE OTTOMAN
CRIMEAN WAR (1853 – 1856) by Candan Badem; BRILL OPEN, Leiden * Boston 2010}
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