THE IMPACT
OF THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION ON CIVIL CONFLICT IN GREECE (1943-1949)
IV
…On the international level, the
Macedonian question became once again the focal point of the Greek government’s
case. Greece , it was argued,
was faced with not with internal civil war, but with an international
conspiracy aiming at turning Greece
into a communist state, or a movement aspiring at detaching Macedonia . Both
the earlier U.N. Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier
Incidents and its successor, the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, were
provided with whatever evidence was available on the subject: even wartime
alleged, but in fact forged KKE agreements with neighboring countries for the
cession of Macedonia
to a Balkan communist federation. There was, of course, ample documentation for
the material support offered to the Greek communist insurgents by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria ,
and for the statements by these states on the future unification of Macedonia . But
until the latter part of 1947, when Bled agreement was concluded, it was
difficult to build a thoroughly convincing case, particularly for inquisitive
third parties.
What counted most, however, was
whether the Greek government’s threat perceptions were shared in London and Washington .
The British government, having already committed itself in retaining Greece in the
Western fold, needed little convincing. In the event, it frequently
spear-headed anti-Soviet bloc polemics, utilizing the argument of the threat
posed to Greece ’s
territorial integrity by Yugoslav aspirations on Macedonia . Similarly, the United States , being
more and more involved in Greek affairs, found the Macedonian question a valid
argument to justify its policy. Yet, at times, more reserved assessments were
voiced. Such was the Case of Labor Foreign Minister Bevin, in late 1946, who
held the view that Yugoslav public statements for the unification of Macedonia were for internal consumption, and in
no way could constitute an imminent threat to Greece ’s territorial integrity.
Later, however, when Soviet threat in the direction of the Straits began to
develop, the Foreign Office and subsequently the State Department, assumed that
the case of Macedonia and Thrace , along with the Straits, constituted a
well-designed Soviet objective aimed at controlling the Aegean .
What appeared to be in doubt was the timing of Soviet initiative. Thus, the
Macedonian question gradually emerged as a peon in the global context of
East-West relations.
It is interesting to note that
for the same reasons, the Turks also expressed deep concern about rumors for
the establishment of a unified Macedonian state that would include Greek
Macedonia. In the view of a Turkish diplomat, a Slavo-Macedonian state, with Thessaloniki included, would reduce Greece to impotence and cut Turkey from Europe .
In such case, he concluded, “if there were not Greece ,
there would be no Turkey ”.
Under the circumstances, the
State Department took the view that the crux of the Macedonian problem was the
maintenance of the territorial integrity of Greece itself. And although the United States could have no saying over a
possible unification of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav parts of Macedonia , the preservation of Greece ’s
frontiers against irredentist claims by northern neighbors, justified “all
possible and appropriate steps” by the U.S. Government.
Such concern was not without some
basis. The Macedonian unification scheme that had emerged in the last months of
1944, in the abortive Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations for a South-Slav
Federation, resurfaced with the conclusion of the Tito—Dimitrov agreements at
Bled and Evxinograd (August and November 1947, respectively). Despite certain
nuances as to the timing and the sequence of the steps necessary to implement
the agreements, the fact was that the leader of Bulgaria
committed his country to the cession of Pirin Macedonia
to Yugoslavia .
Along with the last portion of Macedonian land, Dimitrov’s Bulgaria was relinquishing all future interest
in Macedonian affairs in exchange for a federation arrangement with Yugoslavia and the return of the “Western
Bulgarian regions”, annexed by Yugoslavia
after World War I.
There is no doubt that an
arrangement was reached at Bled on the fate of Greek Macedonia as well. No
concrete details were revealed at the time, nor have became known since. Two
years later, however, in 1949, Tito publicly revealed that the case of Greek
Macedonia had been examined and that two leaders had decided to “definitely
solve Macedonian question as a whole;
the Macedonian people not only in the Vardar, but in Pirin, and Aegean Macedonia
Despite the fate of the South
Slav Federation, the signing of the agreement was a turning point for the
Macedonian question. Yugoslavia
had finally secured a contractual agreement from Bulgaria to be master of the
coveted land. But what had been the position of the KKE leaders on this
triangular question? There was an inexplicable silence at the time, that has
been maintained to this day. Was Zachariadis aware of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian
deliberations throughout 1947? Was he consulted by Tito and/or Dimitrov? And if
so, what were his reactions, if not his comments? Opponents suspected the worse:
possibly a tacit consent. But they have produced no proof to support their
suspicion. The question resurfaced after the publication in 1979 of a certain
documents from the KKE archives.
On April 14th 1947,
Zachariadis, than in Yugoslavia
along with the Polit Bureau of the KKE, sent to Vafiadis his instructions
outlining the strategic objective of the struggle. He wrote:
-“Events show that the region
that constitutes the weakest and the most important point for the enemy, which
offers the people’s democratic movement the most favorable politico-social
prerequisites, is Macedonia and Thrace, wit Thessaloniki at a center. Thus,
under these conditions, a basic objective for DAG today is the occupation of Thessaloniki , which would
bring a decisive change of the situation and would solve their our entire
problem.”-
Zachariadis presented the same
views in his memorandum to Tito, following their talks on April 22nd.
He added that the Northern Greece for
“monarchofascism” was its weakest – and most important – point from a social
economic, political, national,
military and geopolitical viewpoint”. Consequently, DAG was planning to
concentrate its main strike in this region. The final objective was to secure a
territorial base for the establishment of a nucleus for a “Free Greece”.
The plan was approved by Tito and
subsequently by the Soviet leadership. It was endorsed by the Third Plenum of
the CC of KKE in October 1947. Whether this plan, discussed extensively with
the leadership of the CPY – which would bear most of the burden for its
logistical support – fitted Tito’s perception for a South Slav federation and
unified Macedonian state is till matter of speculation. The timing, however,
coincides with the Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations, which led to the Bled agreement.
Furthermore, reference in Zachariadis’ memorandum to Tito, to the national factor, as one of the points of
weakness of the Greek government for keeping Northern Greece – a reference
missing in the instructions sent to Vafiadis – should be interpreted as
referring to the question of national minorities. To venture further in
speculation without more concrete evidence, is precarious. Nevertheless, the
time coincidence of the discussion of the two projects – the establishment of a
“free Greek state” in Northern Greece, and the unified Macedonian state in the
context of South Slav federation – leaves Zachariadis exposed to the assumption
that he might have had at least some knowledge of the aims of the two Balkan
leaders.
Putting aside the military aspects
of the Civil War, it appears that the aid furnished to the KKE was not up to
the initial, grandiose of Soviet-Yugoslav relations did not augur well for the
revolution in Greece .
The crisis that came into the open, late in June 1948, left no choice to Zachariadis
but to side with the Soviet Union .
This time, the spotlight of the
Macedonian question shifted in direction of Yugoslav Macedonia. Initial
statements by Bulgarian leaders denied neither existence of “Macedonians”, nor
the ideal of a “united Macedonian state”. But, as it has frequently happened in
the history of Macedonia ,
names assumed different meanings in the service of different and, at times,
contradictory political ends. The “Macedonians” – in Bulgarian propaganda
literature – were now linked to the Bulgarians, while reference to a “united
Macedonian state”, in a South Slav federation, certainly was not the concept
envisaged in Bled; it rather brought recollections of the 1924 Comintern
prototype. In the last months of 1948, however, a long-term solution to the
Macedonian question was not the major preoccupation of the Bulgarian leaders,
who had now hard work to eradicate four years of “Macedonian” infiltration in
Bulgarian Macedonia, before turning their attention to reintroducing Bulgarian nationalism
among the population of the P.R. of Macedonia.
Such was the situation in his
immediate vicinity when Zachariadis sought to seize full control of NOF and
Slavo-Macedonians at home. New documents reveal that in the second half of
1948, KKE, having already side with Cominform, lost no time to remove pro-Tito
Slavo-Macedonians from the leadership of NOF and from important posts in
regional KKE organizations. By one stroke, the KKE leadership freed itself not
only of avowed Titoists, but also of extremist nationalists, maintaining close
relations with P.R. of Macedonia. Nevertheless, instead of attempting to stamp
out “Macedonian” nationalism and consolidate the slavophone element within the
Greek revolutionary movement, Zachariadis revealed his weakness by going in
other direction. Having placed trusted Slavophones at the head of NOF, he
initiated a series of measures aiming at raising the level of indoctrination
and education of slavophone peasants and andartes in the concept of “Macedonian
nation”. That was, no doubt, a policy full of contradictions, dictated by
international developments and the specific requirements of the armed struggle.
Imitating the Bulgarian communists, Zachariadis tried to profit – or at least
not to lose – from the turn of Macedonian politics. His own gamble – if it were
not dictated from abroad – came late in January 1949.
The announcement of the Fifth
Plenum resolution (31.1.1949), particularly its reference to the Macedonian
question, created reverberations around the world’s chanceries, reappraisal of
attitudes towards the KKE of the fence-standing segment of Greek public opinion
and politicians, and eventually the hardening of Greek government policy
towards KKE that survived the end of the Civil War for decades. Worse yet, it
made collaboration with Tito’s Yugoslavia
almost impossible. In-Party criticism came into the open immediately after the
defeat, and continued until Zachariadis’ expulsion from the leadership of the
Party.
Briefly stated, the new Party
line, as presented in a series of documents and public statements, was the
re-introduction of the 1924 platform for an independent Macedonian state,
probably within a Balkan communist federation. The difference was that, whereas
the 1924 decision was merely statement of intent, its 1949 reproduction
appeared as an action program of a revolution in full swing. Certainly, the
full extent of this major policy shift, is not and could not be reflected in a
carefully worded Central Committee resolution. To understand the policy behind
it, the historian needs to see all official statements made at the time
(including those of KKE-controlled NOF) the measures taken by the KKE
leadership to implement the decision, and the criticism voiced from within the
Party hierarchy after the defeat, while Zachariadis was still at the helm.
Undoubtedly, detailed accounts and documents released in recent years by
pro-Tito Slavo-Macedonians give a better perspective, although caution is need
for points of omission.
The basic, much-quoted texts are
the Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the CC of KKE (January 31st ),
the Decision of the Executive Council of NOF (February 4th ), KKE
and NOF “disclaimers” (broadcast by the Radio Free Greece on March 8th
and 9th ) and the Resolution of the 2nd Congress of NOF
(end of March). These texts clearly indicate that after the successful
conclusion of the revolution, the Slavo-Macedonians would be able to establish
their own Macedonian state within a Balkan communist federation.
…
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