23.
THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY
The new international order.-The welfare state,- Youthful Britain.-A
popular monarchy.-The loss of empire.-Britain, Europe and the United
States.-Northern Ireland.-Scotland and Wales.-The years of discontent.-The new
politics.-Britain: past, present and future
It was perhaps, natural that Britain was unable to give proper attention to
its relations with Europe until it was no
longer an imperial power. Ever since the growth of its trade beyond Europe
during the seventieth century, Britain
has ceased to be fully active in Europe except
at moments of crisis. As long as Europe did not interfere with Britain ’s trade, and as long as the banalnce of
power in Europe was not seriously disturbed, Britain
could happily neglect Europe ’s affairs.
At the end of the eighteenth century, Napoleonic
France drew Britain
furth er into European politics that it had been,
perhaps, since the Hundred Years war. In 1815 Britain
cooperated with the other European powers to ensure peace, and it withdrew this
support because it did not wis h to work with
the despotic powers than governing the most of Europe .
For the rest of the century, Europe an affairs
took second place to empire and imperial trade.
After the First World
Wa r it was natural that some Europeans should
try to create Europe an union that would
prevent a repetition of war. A few British people welcomed the idea. But when France proposed such arrangement in 1930, one
British politician spoke for the majority of nation: Our hearts are not in
Europe; we could nev er share the truly
European point of view nor become real patriots of Europe .
Besides, we could nev er
give up our own patriotism for an Empire which extends in all parts of the
world… The character of the British people makes it imposible for us to take
part seriously in any pan-European system.”
Since than Britain has found it difficult to
move away from this point od view. After the Second Wolrd
Wa r the value of Europe an
unity was a good deal clearer. In 1946 Churchhill called for “United
St ates of Europe”, but it
was already too late to prevent the division of Europe
into two blocs. In 1949 Britain
joined with the other Western European countries to form the Council of Europe,
“to achieve greater unity between members”, but it is doubtful how far this aim
has been achieved. Ind eed, eight years later
in 1957, Britain
refused to join the six other European countries in the creation of a European
Common Market. Britain
was unwilling to surrender any sovereignty or control over its own affairs, and
said it still felt responsibility towards its empire.
It quickly become clear that Britain ’s attitude, particularly in
view of rapid loss of empire, was mistaken. As its financial and economic
difficulties increased, Britain
could not afford to stay out of Europe . But it
was too late: when Britain
tried to join the European Community in 1963, and again in 1967, the French
President General de Gaulle refused to allow it. Britain only become member in 1973,
after de Ga ulle’s retirement.
After becoming a member in 1973, Britain ’s
attitude towards the European Community continued to be unenthusiastic.
Although trade with Europe greatly increased, most British continued to feel
that they had not had any economic benefit from Europe .
This feeling was strengthened by the way in which Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher argued for a better financial deal for Britain in the Community affairs.
The way in which she fought won her some admiration in Britain , but also anger in many parts of Europe . She welcomed closer co-operaton in the Europe an Community but only if this not mean any
lessening of sovereignty. Many Europe ans saw
this as a contradiction. Unless member states were willing to surrender some
control over their own affairs, they argued, there could be little chance of
achieving greater Europe an unity. It is not
surprising therefore that Britain ’s
European partners wondered whether Britain was still unable “to take
part seriously in any Pan-Europaen system”.
After the war, Britain
found itself unable to keep up with the military arms race between the United
St ates and the Soviet Union . It soon gave up the idea of an ind ependent nuclear deterrent, and in 1962 took America n “Po laris”
nuclear missiles for British submarines. The possession of these weapons gave Britain ,
in words of one Prime Minister, the right “to sit at the top of the table” with
the Superpowers. However, Britain
could only use this missiles by agreement with the United
St ates and as a result, Britain was tied more closely to the United St ates .
Other European countries would not have felt so
uneasy about the close ties between the United
St ates and Britain if they themselves had not disagreed
with the United St ates
concerning Soviet Union and other foreign
policy matters. Ever since 1945, the United
States and the political right in Britain were more openly hostile to the Soviet Union . The Europe ans
and the British political left were, on the whole, just as suspicious of Soviet
intetions, but were more anxious to improve relations. However, even under
their Labour governments, Britain
remained between the European and America n
positions. It was natural, therefore, that under Thatcher, who was more firmly
to the right than any Conservative Prime Minister since the war, British
foreign policy was more closely linked to that of the United States ,
particularly to the Soviet Union. This was most clearly shawn when, after the
Russians invaded Afganistan , Britain joined the United
St ates in
boycotting the Moscow Olimpics in 1980. Britain sided with the United States in other foreign
policy matters too, which alarmed its European partners. In 1986, for example,
it allowed US aircraft to
use British airfields from which to attack the Libyan capital, Tripoli . One thing was
clear from these events. Britain s has not made up
its mind whether its first political loyalty lay across Atlantic, or in Europe .
When Ireland was devided in 1921, the
population of the new republic was only 5% Protestant. But in Ulster , the new province
of N o t h e r n
Ir e l a n d,
67% of the People were protestant. Form many years it seemed that almost
everyone accepted the arrangement, even if some did not like it.
However, many people in Northern Ireland considered that
their system of government was unfair. It was a self-governing province, but
its government was controlled by the Protestants, who feared the Catholics and
kept them out of responsible postitions. Many Catholic were even unable to
vote.
Suddenly, in 1969, Ulster people, both Catholics and
Protestants, began to gath er on the streets and
demand a fairer system. The police could not keep control, and republicans who
wanted to unite Ireland
turned civil rights movement into nationalist rebellion against the British
rule.
In order to keep law and order, British soldiers
were sent to help the police, but many Catholics saw them as foreign army with
no right to be there.
Violence has continued, with bomb attacks and
shootings by republicans, which British army tried to prevent. In 1972, the Northern Ireland government was removed, and was
replaced with direct rule from London .
Since than, Britain
has been anxious to find a solution which will please most of the people there,
and offer peace to everyone.
In 1985, Britain
and Ireland made a formal
agreement at Hillsboro ugh that they would
exchange views on Northern
Ireland regularly. This agreement was
bitterly opposed by Protestant political leaders in the province. But their
failure to put a stop to a Hillsboro ugh
Agreement resulted in a growing challenge from those Protestants who wanted to
continue the struggle outside Parliament and possibly in a military form.
The future of Northern Ireland remains uncertain.
Tha Catholic population is increasing slightly faster than the Protestant one,
but there are unlikely to be more Catholics than Protestant for a very long
time. Meanwhile, young people in Northern Ireland cannot remember a
time when there was peace in the province.
In Scotland
and Wales , too, there was a
growing feeling by the 1970s that the government in London had too much power. In Wales ,
a nationalistic party Plaid Cymru, the party of “fellow countrymen”, became a
strong political force in the 1970s. But Wels h
nationalism lost support in 1979, when the people of Wales turned down the government’s
offer of limited self government. Almost certainly this was because many of
them did not welcome wider official use of the Wels h language. In spite of the rise of Plaid
Cymru, the Wels h
language was actually spoken less and less. In 1951, 29% of the Wels h population spoke Wels h. By 1981, this figure had fallen to
19%, even though Wels h
was used for many radio and televison programmes, and in school.
In Scotland , the Scotish Nationalistic
Party (SNP) showed its growing popularity by increasing its percentage of the
national vote from 20% to 30% during 1974. The SNP became the second party in Scotland ,
pushing the Conservatives into third place. When Scotland
was offered the same limited form of self-government as Wales , just over a half of those
who voted supported it. But the government decided that 54% of those who voted
was not a big enough majority, and to the anger of the SNP, it abandoned the
self-government offer. As a result, the SNP itself collapsed at the next
election, losing nine of its eleven seats. But like Plaid Cymru in Wales ,
the SNP remained actove in the Scottish politics. In both countries most people
continued to support the Labour Party, partly in protest against mainly
Conservative England. Although in Wales ,
Wels h was declining, and although in Scotland only a very few people still spoke
Gaelic, the different political and cultural life of Celtic
Wa les and Scotland seemed unlikely to
disappear.
THE
YEARS OF DISCONTENT
…
(“AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF BRITAIN ”; Longman Group UK limited – 1989)