Дејвид МекДауел: ИЛУСТРИРАНА ИСТОРИЈА НА БРИТАНИЈА

23.

THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

The new international order.-The welfare state,- Youthful Britain.-A popular monarchy.-The loss of empire.-Britain, Europe and the United States.-Northern Ireland.-Scotland and Wales.-The years of discontent.-The new politics.-Britain: past, present and future

BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

It was perhaps, natural that Britain was unable to give proper attention to its relations with Europe until it was no longer an imperial power. Ever since the growth of its trade beyond Europe during the seventieth century, Britain has ceased to be fully active in Europe except at moments of crisis. As long as Europe did not interfere with Britain’s trade, and as long as the banalnce of power in Europe was not seriously disturbed, Britain could happily neglect Europe’s affairs.

At the end of the eighteenth century, Napoleonic France drew Britain further into European politics that it had been, perhaps, since the Hundred Years war. In 1815 Britain cooperated with the other European powers to ensure peace, and it withdrew this support because it did not wish to work with the despotic powers than governing the most of Europe. For the rest of the century, European affairs took second place to empire and imperial trade.

After the First World War it was natural that some Europeans should try to create European union that would prevent a repetition of war. A few British people welcomed the idea. But when France proposed such arrangement in 1930, one British politician spoke for the majority of nation: Our hearts are not in Europe; we could never share the truly European point of view nor become real patriots of Europe. Besides, we could never give up our own patriotism for an Empire which extends in all parts of the world… The character of the British people makes it imposible for us to take part seriously in any pan-European system.”

Since than Britain has found it difficult to move away from this point od view. After the Second Wolrd War the value of European unity was a good deal clearer. In 1946 Churchhill called for “United States of Europe”, but it was already too late to prevent the division of Europe into two blocs. In 1949 Britain joined with the other Western European countries to form the Council of Europe, “to achieve greater unity between members”, but it is doubtful how far this aim has been achieved. Indeed, eight years later in 1957, Britain refused to join the six other European countries in the creation of a European Common Market. Britain was unwilling to surrender any sovereignty or control over its own affairs, and said it still felt responsibility towards its empire.

It quickly become clear that Britain’s attitude, particularly in view of rapid loss of empire, was mistaken. As its financial and economic difficulties increased, Britain could not afford to stay out of Europe. But it was too late: when Britain tried to join the European Community in 1963, and again in 1967, the French President General de Gaulle refused to allow it. Britain only become member in 1973, after de Gaulle’s retirement.

After becoming a member in 1973, Britain’s attitude towards the European Community continued to be unenthusiastic. Although trade with Europe greatly increased, most British continued to feel that they had not had any economic benefit from Europe. This feeling was strengthened by the way in which Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued for a better financial deal for Britain in the Community affairs. The way in which she fought won her some admiration in Britain, but also anger in many parts of Europe. She welcomed closer co-operaton in the European Community but only if this not mean any lessening of sovereignty. Many Europeans saw this as a contradiction. Unless member states were willing to surrender some control over their own affairs, they argued, there could be little chance of achieving greater European unity. It is not surprising therefore that Britain’s European partners wondered whether Britain was still unable “to take part seriously in any Pan-Europaen system”.

De Gaulle’s attitude to Britain was not only the result of  his dislike of “AngloSaxons”. He also believed that Britain could not make up its mind whether its first loyalty, now that its empire was rapidly disappearing, was to Europe or to the United States.

Britain felt its “special relationship” with the United States was particularly important. It was vaguely believed that this relationship came from the fact that the United States was basically Anglo-Saxon. Neither belief was wholly true, for the United States since 1783 had been a good deal more democratic than Britain, and most US citizens were not Anglo-Saxons. Even Britain’s alliance with the United States was very recent. In 1814 British troops had burnt down the US capital, Washington. In the middle of the nineteenth century most British took part of the South in the American Civil War. By the end of the century, the United States was openly critical of Britain’s empire.

Britain’s special relationship rested almost entirely on a common language, on its wartime alliance with the United States and the Cold War which followed it. In particular, it resulted from the close relationship Winston Churchill enjoyed with the American people.

After the war, Britain found itself unable to keep up with the military arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. It soon gave up the idea of an independent nuclear deterrent, and in 1962 took American “Polaris” nuclear missiles for British submarines. The possession of these weapons gave Britain, in words of one Prime Minister, the right “to sit at the top of the table” with the Superpowers. However, Britain could only use this missiles by agreement with the United States and as a result, Britain was tied more closely to the United States.

Other European countries would not have felt so uneasy about the close ties between the United States and Britain if they themselves had not disagreed with the United States concerning Soviet Union and other foreign policy matters. Ever since 1945, the United States and the political right in Britain were more openly hostile to the Soviet Union. The Europeans and the British political left were, on the whole, just as suspicious of Soviet intetions, but were more anxious to improve relations. However, even under their Labour governments, Britain remained between the European and American positions. It was natural, therefore, that under Thatcher, who was more firmly to the right than any Conservative Prime Minister since the war, British foreign policy was more closely linked to that of the United States, particularly to the Soviet Union. This was most clearly shawn when, after the Russians invaded Afganistan, Britain joined the United States in boycotting the Moscow Olimpics in 1980. Britain sided with the United States in other foreign policy matters too, which alarmed its European partners. In 1986, for example, it allowed US aircraft to use British airfields from which to attack the Libyan capital, Tripoli. One thing was clear from these events. Britains has not made up its mind whether its first political loyalty lay across Atlantic, or in Europe.

NORTHERN IRELAND

When Ireland was devided in 1921, the population of the new republic was only 5% Protestant. But in Ulster, the new province of Nothern Ireland, 67% of the People were protestant. Form many years it seemed that almost everyone accepted the arrangement, even if some did not like it.

However, many people in Northern Ireland considered that their system of government was unfair. It was a self-governing province, but its government was controlled by the Protestants, who feared the Catholics and kept them out of responsible postitions. Many Catholic were even unable to vote.

Suddenly, in 1969, Ulster people, both Catholics and Protestants, began to gather on the streets and demand a fairer system. The police could not keep control, and republicans who wanted to unite Ireland turned civil rights movement into nationalist rebellion against the British rule.

In order to keep law and order, British soldiers were sent to help the police, but many Catholics saw them as foreign army with no right to be there.

Violence has continued, with bomb attacks and shootings by republicans, which British army tried to prevent. In 1972, the Northern Ireland government was removed, and was replaced with direct rule from London. Since than, Britain has been anxious to find a solution which will please most of the people there, and offer peace to everyone.

In 1985, Britain and Ireland made a formal agreement at Hillsborough that they would exchange views on Northern Ireland regularly. This agreement was bitterly opposed by Protestant political leaders in the province. But their failure to put a stop to a Hillsborough Agreement resulted in a growing challenge from those Protestants who wanted to continue the struggle outside Parliament and possibly in a military form.

The future of Northern Ireland remains uncertain. Tha Catholic population is increasing slightly faster than the Protestant one, but there are unlikely to be more Catholics than Protestant for a very long time. Meanwhile, young people in Northern Ireland cannot remember a time when there was peace in the province.

SCOTLAND AND WALES

In Scotland and Wales, too, there was a growing feeling by the 1970s that the government in London had too much power. In Wales, a nationalistic party Plaid Cymru, the party of “fellow countrymen”, became a strong political force in the 1970s. But Welsh nationalism lost support in 1979, when the people of Wales turned down the government’s offer of limited self government. Almost certainly this was because many of them did not welcome wider official use of the Welsh language. In spite of the rise of Plaid Cymru, the Welsh language was actually spoken less and less. In 1951, 29% of the Welsh population spoke Welsh. By 1981, this figure had fallen to 19%, even though Welsh was used for many radio and televison programmes, and in school.

In Scotland, the Scotish Nationalistic Party (SNP) showed its growing popularity by increasing its percentage of the national vote from 20% to 30% during 1974. The SNP became the second party in Scotland, pushing the Conservatives into third place. When Scotland was offered the same limited form of self-government as Wales, just over a half of those who voted supported it. But the government decided that 54% of those who voted was not a big enough majority, and to the anger of the SNP, it abandoned the self-government offer. As a result, the SNP itself collapsed at the next election, losing nine of its eleven seats. But like Plaid Cymru in Wales, the SNP remained actove in the Scottish politics. In both countries most people continued to support the Labour Party, partly in protest against mainly Conservative England. Although in Wales, Welsh was declining, and although in Scotland only a very few people still spoke Gaelic, the different political and cultural life of Celtic Wales and Scotland seemed unlikely to disappear.

THE YEARS OF DISCONTENT

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(“AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF BRITAIN”; Longman Group UK limited – 1989)