6.
Anarchic Structures and Balances of Power
Two tasks remain: first, to examine the
character of anarchy and the expectations about outcomes associated with
anarchic realms; second, to examine the ways in which expectations vary as the
structure of an anarchic system changes through changes in the distribution of
capabilities across nations. The second task, undertaken in chapters 7,8 and 9,
requires comparing different international systems. The first, which I now turn
to, is best accomplished by drawing some comparisons between behavior and
outcomes in anarchic and hierarchic realms.
I.
1. VIOLENCE AT HOME AND ABROAD
The state among the states, it is often said,
conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states
may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so – or live at
the mercy of their military more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of
nature is a state of war. This is meant not in the sense that war constantly
occurs, but in the sense that, with each state deciding for itself whether or
not to use force, war may at any time break out. Whether in the family, the
community, or the world at large, contact without at least the occasional
conflict is inconceivable; and the hope that in the absence of an agent to
manage or to manipulate conflicting parties the use of force will always be
avoided cannot be realistically entertained. Among men as among states,
anarchy, or absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of
violence.
The threat of violence and the recurrent use of
force are said to distinguish international from national affairs. But in the
history of the world, surely most rulers have had to bear in mind that their
subjects might use force to resist or overthrow them. If the absence of
government is associated with the threat of violence, so also is its presence. A
haphazard list of national tragedies illustrates the point all too well. The
most destructive wars of the hundred years following the defeat of Napoleon
took place not among states but within them. Estimates of deaths in
If anarchy is identified with chaos,
destruction and death, then the distinction between anarchy and government does
not tell much. Which is more precarious: the life of a state among the states,
or of government in relation to its subjects? The answer varies with time or
place. Among some states at some times, the actual or expected occurrence of
violence is low. Within some states at some times, the actual expected
occurrence of violence is high. The use of force, or the constant fear of its
use, are not sufficient grounds for distinguishing international from domestic
affairs. If the possible and the actual use of force mark both national or
international orders, then no durable distinction between the two realms can be
drawn in terms of the use or the nonuse of force. No human order is proof
against violence.
To discover qualitative differences between
internal and external affairs one must look for a criterion other than the
occurrence of violence. The distinction between international and national
realms of politics is not found in the use of the nonuse of force but in their
different structures. But if the dangers of being violently attacked is
greater, say, in taking an evening stroll through downtown Detroit then they
are in picnicking along the French and German border, what practical difference
does the difference between of structure make? Nationally as internationally,
contacts generates conflict and at time issues in violence. The difference
between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in
the different modes of organization for doing something about it. A government,
ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the right to use
force – that is, to apply a variety of sanctions to control the use of force by
its subjects. If some use private force, other may appeal to the government. A
government has no monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An
effective government, however, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force, and legitimate here means that public agents are organized to prevent
ant to counter the private use of force. Citizens need not to prepare to defend
themselves. Public agencies do that. A national system is not one of self-help.
The international system is.
2. INTERDEPENDANCE AND INTEGRATION
The political significance of interdependence
varies depending on whether a realm is organized, with relations on authority
specified and established, or remains formally unorganized. Insofar as a realm
is formally organized, its units are free to specialize, to pursue their own
interests without concern for developing the means of maintaining their
identity and preserving their security in the presence of others. They are free
to specialize because they have no reason to fear the increased interdependence
that goes with specialization. If those who specialize most benefit most, then
competition in specialization ensues. Goods are manufactured, grain is
produced, law and order are maintained, commerce is conducted, and financial
services are provided by people who ever more narrowly specialize. In simple
economic terms, the cobbler depends on the tailor for his pants and the tailor
on the cobbler for his shoes, and each would be ill-clad without services of
the other. In simple political terms,
Differences between national and international
structures are reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends
and develop the means for reaching them. In anarchic realms, like units co-act.
In hierarchic realm, the units are differentiated, and they tend to increase
the extent of their specialization. Differentiated units become closely
interdependent, the more closely so as their specialization proceeds. Because
of the difference of the structure, interdependence within and interdependence
among nations are two distinct concepts. So as to follow the logicians’
admonition to keep a single meaning for a given term throughout one’s
discourse. I shall use “integration” to describe the condition within nations
and “interdependence” to describe the condition among them.
Although states are like units functionally
they differ vastly in their capabilities. Out of such differences something of
a division of labor develops (see Chapter 9). The division of labor across
nations, however, is slight in comparison with the highly articulated division
of labor among them. Integration draws the parts of a nation closely together.
Interdependence among nations leaves them loosely connected. Although the
integration of the nations is often talked about, it seldom takes place. Nations
could mutually enrich themselves by further dividing not just the labor that
goes into the production of goods but also some of the other tasks they
perform, such as political management and military defense. Who dos their
integration not take place? The structure of international politics limits the
cooperation of states in two ways.
In a self-help system each of the units spends
a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the
means of protection itself against others. Specialization in a system of
divided labor works to everyone’s advantage, though not equally so. Inequality
in expected distribution of the increased product works strongly against
extension of the division of labor internationally. When faced with the
possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask
how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not “Will both of us
gain” but “Who will gain more?” If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in a
ration of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement
a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large
absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as
each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities. Notice that the
impediments to collaboration may not lie in the character and the immediate
intention of either party. Instead, the condition of insecurity – at the least,
the uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions – works
against their cooperation.
In any self-help system, units worry about
their survival, and the worry conditions their behavior. Oligopolistic markets limit
the cooperation of states. Within rules laid down by governments, whether firms
survive and prosper depends on their own effort. Firms need not to protect
themselves physically against assaults from other firms. They are free to
concentrate on their economic interests. As economic entities, however, they
live in a self-help world. All want to increase profits. If they run undue
risks in the effort to do so, they must expect to suffer the consequences. As
William Fellner says, it is “impossible to maximize joint gains without the
collusive handling of all relevant variables”. And this can be accomplished
only by “complete disarmament of firms in relations to each other”. But cannot
sensibly disarm even to increase their profits. This statement qualifies,
rather than contradicts, the assumption that firms aim at maximum profits. To
maximize profits tomorrow as well as today, firms first have to survive. Pooling
all resources implies, again as Fellner puts in, “discounting the future
possibilities of all participating firms” (1949, p. 35). But the future cannot
be discounted. The relative strength of firms changes over time in ways that
cannot be foreseen. Firms are constrained to strike a compromise between
maximizing their profits and minimizing the danger of their own demise. Each of
two firms may be better off if one of them accepts compensation from the other
in return of withdrawing from some part of the market. But a firm that accepts
smaller markets, in exchange for larger profits will be gravely disadvantaged
if, for example, a price war should break out as part of renewed struggle for
markets. If possible, one must resist accepting smaller markets in return for
larger profits (…). “It is”, Fellner insists, “not advisable to disarm in relation
to one’s rivals” (p. 199). Why not? Because “the potentiality of renewed
warfare always exists” (p. 177). Fellner’s reasoning is much like the reasoning
that led Lenin to believe that capitalist countries would never be able to
cooperate with their mutual enrichment in one vast imperial enterprise. Like
nations, oligopolistic firms must be more concerned with relative strength than
with absolute advantage.
A state worries about a division of possible
gains that may favor others more than itself. That is the first way in which
the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states. A
state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative
endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. That is the second way in which the
structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states. The more
a state specialize, the more it relies on others to supply the materials and
goods that it is not producing. The larger the state’s imports and exports, the
more it depends on others. The world’s well-being would be increased if an ever
more elaborate division of labor were developed, but states would thereby place
themselves in situations of ever closer interdependence. Some states may not resist
that. For small and ill-endowed states the costs of doing so are excessively
high. But states that can resist becoming ever more enmeshed with others
ordinarily do so in either or moth ways. States that are heavily dependent, or
closely interdependent, worry about securing that which they depend on. The
high interdependence of states means that the states in question experience, or
are subject to, the common vulnerability that high interdependence entails.
Like other organizations, states seek to control what they depend on or to lessen
the extent of their dependency. This simple thought explains quite a bit of the
behavior of the states; their imperial thrusts to widen the scope of their
control and their autarchic strivings toward grater self-sufficiency.
Structures encourage certain behaviors and
penalize those who do not respond to the encouragement. Nationally, many lament
the extreme development of the division of labor, a development that results in
the allocation of ever narrower tasks to the individuals. And yet, specialization
proceeds, and its extent is a measure of the development of the societies. In a
formally organized realm a premium is put on each unit’s being able to
specialize in order to increase its value to others in a system of divided
labor. The domestic imperative is “specialize”! Internationally, many lament
the resources states spend unproductively for their own defense and the
opportunities they miss to enhance the welfare of their people through
cooperation with other states. And yet the ways of states change little. In an
unorganized realm each unit’s incentive is to put itself in a position to be
able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted to do so. The
international imperative is “take care of yourself”! Some leaders of nations
may understand that the well-being of all of them would increase through their
participation in a fuller division of labor. But to act on the idea would be to
act on a domestic imperative, an imperative that does not run internationally.
What one might want to do in absence of structural constraints is different
from what one is encouraged to do in their presence. States do not willingly
place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system,
considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.
What each state does for itself is much like
what all others are doing. They are denied the advantages that a full division
of labor, political as well as economic, would provide. Defense spending,
moreover, is unproductive for all and unavoidable for most. Rather than
increased well-being, their reward is in the maintenance of their autonomy.
States compete, but not by contributing their individual efforts to the joint
production of goods for their mutual benefit. Here is a second big difference
between international-political and economic system, one which is discussed in
part I, section 4, of the next chapter.
3. STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES
…
(Kenneth Waltz: Theory of International
Politics; University of California – Berkeley; Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company 1979)
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