CHAPTER XVII. 1914 – 1915
…Negotiations had at the same
time been proceeding with Roumania , Greece and Bulgaria ,
and from the language originally held by M. Bratiano we had reason to hope that
Roumania would at once follow Italy ’s
example. Though aware that Italy
was on the point of declaring war on Austria , she let slip the
favourable moment in the spring of 1915, when the Russian army might save the
situation. The tide of war had now turned in Germany ’s favour, and the father
the Russians retired the less disposed was she to throw down to the gauntlet to
the Central Powers. But, apart from the military question, the negotiations
respecting the political agreement that was to record the price to be paid for
her intervention dragged on for months. Bratiano demanded the Pruth and the
Theiss as her future frontier, a demand that meant the incorporation in
Roumania of both Bukowine and the Banat .
From the point of view of her own
national interests Russia
was strongly opposed to Roumania’s acquiring the whole of Bukowine, while
neither she nor her allies felt justified in extending Roumania’s territory
almost to the gates of Belgrade by promising her
the whole of the Banat . But necessity is a
hard taskmaster, and we could not afford to risk permission being given to the
Germans to dispatch war material to the Turks through Roumania. Sazonoff first
made the concession of allowing her to have the major part of the Bukowine, and
then, bowing to the wishes of the Allies, he yielded on the question of the Banat . The latter concession was made subject to certain
conditions proposed by Sir. E. Grey for the safeguard of Serbia ’s interests and for the protection of her
capital as well as on the understanding that the allied Powers would undertake
to compensate Serbia by
facilitating her union with Croatia
if the latter consented. Sazonoff further attached the conditions that Roumania
should take the filed within few weeks. This Bratiano declined to do. He was
ready to conclude a political agreement on the above basis, but insisted that
the actual date for taking action must be depend on the military situation and
on conditions to be embodied in a military convention.
The military situation indeed, at
the end of July was such that Bratiano was probably right in saying that
Roumania to march at that moment would be to court certain disaster. It would
have been different had we won over Bulgaria to our side, for her intervention
would have so improved matters that Roumania could have afforded to run at
risk. On the other hand, a definite assurance of Roumania’s cooperation would
have greatly facilitated our negotiations with Bulgaria . But we had, as Sazonoff
remarked to me, been moving in a vicious circle. We had, therefore, to ask
ourselves which of them could render us the most effective assistance and which
would prove the most dangerous were it to join our enemies. Greece had had recourse to every pretext in
order to evade coming to Serbia ’s
assistance, and it was impossible to count on her cooperation, while, were she
to side with Germany ,
her coast would be at the mercy of the allied fleets. Serbia , on the other hand, could never make
terms with the Central Powers, and it would not be a matter of great moment to
us if she did, out of piquet, delay taking the offensive against Austria . The
one important factor in the situation was Bulgaria . Both for political and
national reasons the forcing of the Dardanelles was of vital interest to Russia , and the
cooperation of the Bulgarian army would greatly facilitate the accomplishment
of the task. We ought, therefore, he maintained, to concentrate all our efforts
on securing that co-operation at the risk of offending other States.
His Majesty’s Government had from
the very outset realized the importance of Bulgaria ’s
co-operation, but in spite of their untiring efforts they had failed to induce
the Governments of Belgrade and Athens
to make sacrifice necessary to secure it. Greece had refused to give up
Cavalla, Serbia had declared that she could not cede national territory without
consent of the Great Skuptschina, and that it was impossible to convoke that
assembly on account of the war. Roumania, on the other hand, had agreed to the
eventual cession of Dobritch and Baltchik. During the course of these
negotioations it became clear that the minimum price at which we could purchase
Bulgaria’a co-operation was the cession of the so-called uncontested zone in Macedonia . That
zone had been recognized as hers under the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty in 1912, but
had, after the Second Balkan War, been assigned to Serbia by the Treaty of Bucharest.
At the end of July it was
decided, on Sir Edward Grey’s suggestion, that the allied representatives at
Belgrade should make an urgent appeal to Serbian Government to consent to its
cession on the termination of the war in return of Bulgaria’s immediate
effective co-operation. The Allies, they were to add, would engage to secure
for Serbia such ample compensation as would fully realize the most important to
her political and economic aspirations, and would also guarantee that her
territorial connection with Greece should be preserved. In order that this
appeal might carry more weight, I was instructed to ask for an audience and to
suggest that His Majesty should remind the Prince Regent that he had, at the
beginning of the war, placed the fate of Serbia in the Emperor’s hands and that
the whole course of the war would be imperiled should the Serbian Government
refuse to comply with our request.
The Emperor received me in audience
on July 28, and after I had explained the situation to him, said that he fully
recognized the importance of ensuring the success of our operations in Dardanelles by securing the co-operation of the Bulgarian
army. He could not, however, send such telegram to the Prince Regent. It was
perfectly true that it was on Serbia ’s
account that we have become involved in the war; but Serbia was our ally and we have not
treated her quite fairly. We had, without consulting her, sacrificed some of
her important interests in order to satisfy Italy ,
and we were about to give Roumania the Banat .
A refusal on the part of the Prince Regent would, the Emperor added, place him
in a very awkward position.
I replied that Serbia ’s
heroism had our unstinted admiration and that we fully appreciated the services
which she had rendered during early stages of the war, but that for some months
past she had not been in position to take any action of importance. The Allies,
on the other hands, had never ceased making enormous sacrifices, and Serbia could
not expect to do so indefinitely without herself making some
counter-sacrifices. However much we might sympathize with her, we were fully
justified in asking her to make a concession that would help to shorten the
war. At the time of the First Balkan War access to the Adriatic and not Macedonia had
been the object of her ambitions, and that ambition would now be realized in a
measure which had never before been contemplated. Macedonia ,
moreover, had only been Serbia ’s
since the summer of 1913, while previous to that date it had been recognized as
Bulgarian by the Emperor Alexander II in 1877, and by Serbia herself
in 1912. We were, moreover, only asking her to do what was necessary for her
own safety, as, were Bulgaria
to join the Central Powers, her very existence as a nation would be at stake.
The Emperor was impressed by what
I had said and promised to reconsider the question, adding that it would be
easier for him to act as had been suggested were King George, the King of Italy
and President Poincare to address similar telegrams to the Prince Regent.
Sazonoff, to whom I communicated the substance of this conversation, entirely
concurred in the Emperor’s suggestion, which was entirely adopted. Sazonoff
also remarked that he was very glad that I had spoken as I had done, as all the
Emperor’s sympathies were on the side of Serbia .
The Serbian reply to the
communication eventually made them by the allied Powers was in nature of a
compromise. It was an acceptance in principle, but hedged round with
reservations which, as the Bulgars would be content with nothing less than the
whole of the uncontested zone, rendered it valueless for our purpose. Under the
treaty of alliance which they had concluded in the spring of 1913, Greece and Serbia
had agreed not to cede any districts to the west of the Vardar .
Greece , who had been careful
to evade rendering Serbia
the assistance which her treaty obligations prescribed, pressed for the
observance of this particular clause. Though the negotiations at Sofia and Belgrade
were continued, every day that passed rendered the prospect more hopeless. Russia ’s attitude during the Second Balkan War
had not been forgotten at the former capital, while after the fall of Warsaw and Kovno the
cause of the Allies was regarded lost. King Ferdinand, who had throughout been
intriguing with the Central Powers, was not the man to attach himself to the
losing side, more especially when Germany was prepared to pay him
double the price which the Allies were offering for his co-operation. Our
proposals, moreover, were generally regarded as too vague. Nothing, indeed,
short of an absolute assurance of Bulgaria ’s
acquisition of the uncontested zone would have stayed the march of events,
while the idea of paying off old scores on Serbia was popular with the army.
O’Beirne, who had been with me in
Petrograd as Counsellor of Embassy, and who afterwards lost his life when
travelling with Lord Kitchener to Russia, had been sent as Minister to Sofia,
but unfortunately, too late to retrieve the mistake of his predecessor. He had
early in September expressed the opinion that, though Serbia might
reject some of our demands, she would acquiesce were they impose on her, and he
was, in my opinion, right. I had myself, in conversations which I and my French
colleague had daily with Sazonoff, spoken in a very similar sense. Paleologue,
on the contrary, protested that we could not hold such language or inflict such
a humiliation on an ally. The stakes, however, for which we were playing were
too high to allow considerations for the feeling of any Government to influence
our policy. Could we but have won over Bulgaria to our side, Roumania
would almost certainly have cast in her lot with us in the autumn of 1915. Turkey ’s fate
would then have been sealed, and the whole course of the war would have been
changed. It was, perhaps, natural that Serbia should hesitate to cede what she
regarded as her national territory, but it would have been different had the
allied Governments dictated such a course to her. Had they insisted on her
allowing Bulgaria to occupy
the uncontested zone then and there it is doubtful whether Bulgaria , no
matter how far King Ferdinand had committed himself in the negotiations with
the Central Powers, would, even in the eleventh of hour, have marched against
us. She certainly would not have done so had we taken such action earlier in
the year. Sazonoff did all that it was possible to do under the circumstances,
but he was not empowered to hold the only language that would have turned the
scales at Belgrade .
Strong pressure would, no doubt, have been required to induce the Emperor,
whose sympathies, as was but natural, were all on the side of Serbs, to consent
to the Allies imposing their wishes to the Belgrade . But had they done so the war would
have been considerably shortened and Russia might have been spared the
horrors of the Bolshevik revolution.
With Bulgaria definitely engaged on the
side of the Central Powers and with the Russian army exhausted after its long
retreat, it was useless to expect Roumania to march. Even before the fall of Warsaw the Emperor had
admitted, in the course of my audience recorded above, that it would be a
mistake to press her to take the field till the Russian army was in the
position to resume the offensive. The Allies had, therefore, to content
themselves with the political agreement and to leave the date of her entry into
action to be settled later on by a military convention.
CHAPTER XVIII
…
(My Mission in Russia and
Other Diplomatic Memories
By The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE BUCHANAN … British Ambassador
in Petrograd , 1910-1918)
No comments:
Post a Comment