3. THE
GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION, 1941-9
The Greek
Communist Party, which had partly freed itself from the Macedonian burden in
1935, managed to avoid resuming it until the summer of 1943. Nevertheless, memories of the Party’s
earlier support of Macedonian autonomy seriously hampered its work in the first
two years of the Axis occupation. When the Party, through E.A.M.-E.L.A.S.,
tried to organize resistance in Greek Macedonia, it met with prolonged
resistance from nationalist-minded Greeks. Its chief opponent was Y.V.E., or
the ‘Protectors of Northern Greece’, a nationalist organization which sought to
protect the integrity of Greece ,
and which later re-christened itself P.A.O., the ‘Panhellenic Liberation
Organization’. However, E.A.M. accused this potentially dangerous rival of
collaboration with the Germans, attacked its armed bands, and by the end of
October 1943, had eliminated it. E.A.M. also speedily eliminated lesser rivals
in Greek Macedonia, whom it accused with more justice of collaboration.
In the
early summer of 1943, however, the Greek Communists had to face a more serious
problem: their attitude towards the Slavo-Macedonian minority of Greek Macedonia.
Hitherto the only activity of these Slavo-Macedonians had been to let
themselves be organized, under Bulgarian sponsorship, in home defence units,
mainly to protect their villages against the Greek Communist-led partisans,
E.L.A.S. These units had, however, caused E.L.A.S. relatively little trouble.
Then
Tempo, Tito’s special emissary, having reorganized the partisan movement in
Yugoslav Macedonia and made contact with Enver Hoxha’s Albanian partisans,
crossed the frontier and made contact with the Greek Communists. His object was
to get the Greeks to recognize the potentialities of the Slavo- Macedonians and
to organize them in partisan units under Communist leadership. The Greek
Communists, probably reluctantly, agreed, and S.N.O.F., the Slav National
Liberation Front, was formed, although its name was not publicly heard until
many months afterwards. Either then or later, a Macedonian called Gochev or
Gotsi became military leader of the S.N.O.F. units; and a Greek Communist of
Macedonian origin, Andreas Tsimas, seems to have acted as chief
liaison officer between S.N.O.F. and the Yugoslav partisan movement. It is not
yet clear what part, if any, the Bulgarian Communists played in the formation
of S.N.O.F.
From the
first, the exact degree of subordination of S.N.O.F. to the E.L.A.S. command
seems to have been questionable. The Yugoslav Communists, with a weather eye on
the possible eventual southerly extension of Yugoslav Macedonia, obviously took
a keen interest in S.N.O.F. It is said that as early as November 1943 Tito’s
radio, Free Yugoslavia, broadcast a message of adherence from a south
Macedonian leader. When, however, Marshal Tito himself addressed the second
session of the Anti- Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia at
Jajce on 29 November 1943, he used terms which could not give offence to the
Greek Communists. After speaking of partisan successes in Yugoslav Macedonia,
Tito said: ‘The partisan movement in Macedonia
is closely linked with the partisan movement in Albania
and Greece and at the same
time is giving considerable support to the development of the partisan movement
in Bulgaria
itself.’
The
existence of S.N.O.F., together with wider differences over the strategy of
resistance, presumably explain why war-time relations between the Yugoslav and
Greek Communist leaders were difficult. When Greek Communist emissaries arrived
at Tito’s headquarters, they were treated without any great respect; Yugoslav
partisan representatives, when speaking in confidence, were apt to be critical
of the methods by which the Greek partisans conducted resistance. The Greek
Communists, on their side, must always have been suspicious of Tito’s presumed
aspirations to Greek Macedonia and Salonika .
By the
spring of 1944, when Greece
was approaching liberation, relations between S.N.O.F. and the Greek Communist Party had
become severely strained. Emissaries from Yugoslav Macedonia had by this time
become active in the work of both political and military organization among the
Slavo-Macedonians of Greece .
The leaders of S.N.O.F. looked over the frontier to the Macedonian Communist
Party in Yugoslavia ,
rather than to the Greek Communist Party, for leadership. In fact, in the
summer of 1944 the S.N.O.F. formations commanded by Gochev clashed with
E.L.A.S. on at least three occasions.
The
proclamation of the Macedonian People’s Republic on 2 August 1944 made the
Yugoslav power of attraction doubly strong. On the other hand the Greek
Communist Party, which by then was participating in the internationally recognized
Greek Government and had hopes of winning power in a liberated Greece , was obviously unwilling to ruin its
chances by ceding Macedonian territory to Yugoslavia
or even by sponsoring Macedonian autonomy inside Greece . Tito at this time seems to
have decided that it was more important that the Greek Communists should win
the whole of Greece
than that he himself should win Greek Macedonia. When the liberation of Greece began in September 1944, Tito must have
restrained his enthusiasts in the Macedonian Communist Party, just as he
restrained them over Pirin Macedonia .
Gochev and his S.N.O.F. battalions broke with the Greek Communist Party and
crossed into Yugoslav Macedonia. Gochev himself went to Skoplje; his units were
disbanded and later enrolled in the Yugoslav army.
Little of
these difficulties between the Yugoslav and Greek Communist leaders came into
the open until the break between Tito and the Cominform had led to a break
between Tito and the Greek Communists. Speaking just after the break with the
Cominform, but a year before the open break with the Greek Communists, Tempo
still gave a rosy if somewhat one-sided view of war-time relations between
Yugoslavs and Greeks. Addressing the Yugoslav Communist Party’s Fifth Congress
in July 1948, Tempo said:
The Yugoslav Central Committee
pursued a policy of brotherly co-operation with the heroic Communist Party of
Greece throughout the liberation war. . . Macedonian partisan detachments very
often crossed to the territory
of Aegean Macedonia and
developed lively political work among the local population. Thanks to the correct
political work of our partisan detachments, the Macedonian masses in Aegean
Macedonia realized that the liberation struggle of the Greek people was at the
same time their own struggle, that not only the freedom of the Greek people,
but also the freedom of the Macedonian people depended on the success of that
struggle. . . Our Party activists during the liberation war acquainted their
Greek comrades with the experiences of our Party in organizing a regular army.
. . They acquainted their Greek comrades with their experience in organizing
the people’s revolutionary authority on the ruins of the old State apparatus. .
. Our Party activists conveyed to their Greek comrades their experience in the
struggle against the imperialist tendencies of the western allies. . . Military
and political co-operation between our national liberation army and units of
the Greek Army was exemplary throughout the national liberation war. Macedonian
units always met with great hospitality whenever they had to withdraw to Greek
territory before enemy offensives. . .
Tempo’s
account does of course unwittingly betray two inevitable causes of war-time
irritation to the Greek Communists. The first was the somewhat superior and
patronizing attitude of the Yugoslavs, which must have been nearly unbearable
to Greeks, even if they were Communists. The second was that the Yugoslav
Macedonians considered themselves entitled to conduct ‘political work’ on the
Greek side of the frontier. Although there is no evidence that this implied a
definite pledge by the Greek Communist Party to cede Aegean Macedonia to the
Macedonian People’s Republic, it was a fact which, if widely known, would
inevitably cause serious damage to the Greek Party’s prestige inside Greece .
Greek
Communist resentment was, however, not allowed to find an open vent until Tito
had decided to close the Yugoslav- Greek frontier in July 1949. Then Nikos
Zahariades, Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party, wrote an article in
the issue of 1 August of the Cominform journal, For a Lasting Peace, for a People's
Democracy, in which he bitterly attacked the Yugoslav Communists’ war-time
policy. Zahariades had himself not been in Greece during the occupation, since
he was in a German concentration camp. Much of his article consisted of
fantastically exaggerated charges against Tito designed to fit in with the
general Cominform campaign against him; nevertheless it probably expressed a
good deal of the long-suppressed war-time fears and antagonisms of the Greek
Communists. He said:
The people’s democratic movement
of our country has never, since the times of the first occupation, known such a
cunning and foul enemy as the Tito clique. The Great Serbian chauvinism of the
Tito-ites in relation to the resistance movement in Greece
was evident as far back as 1943, when the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist
Party declared that the people of Aegean Macedonia could only win their
liberation with the framework of Yugoslavia . The corollary of this
was that it was the prime duty of all Macedonian patriots to fight against the
Communist Party of Greece and E.A.M. and instead to collaborate with the Tito
agents.
This [Zahariades continued] was
the directive followed by Tito’s man in Aegean Macedonia, Tempo (Vukmanović).
This was the directive applied in practice by their chief agent, Gochev. . .
During all these years the Tito clique sent thousands of its agents into the
Communist Party of Greece and into E.A.M. with the job of undermining the Communist
Party of Greece and splitting the unity of the people’s liberation movement.
Zahariades
then told the following startling story to illustrate the alleged ‘alliance’
between Anglo-American imperialism and the Tito clique:
In October 1944, when the British
landed in Greece , Tempo, at
the head of the provocative movement directed against the Communist Party of
Greece, informed the Communists of Aegean Macedonia that he had asked Tito for
two divisions to occupy Salonika . This was
before the December events; the British were not sure that they could hold Greece .
Preferring to see Salonika occupied by Tito
than in the hands of E.L.A.S. the British parachuted weapons on to the
aerodrome at Grupitsa. These were sent on to Vapsori by Tito’s agents—Tempo,
Gochev, and Pios—to be used against E.L.A.S. . . In December 1944 Tito, who
dreamed of snatching Salonika from the people’s democratic Greece , did nothing to help us to
fight the British, in spite of all his earlier pompous statements. . .
Zahariades
declared that ‘the Tito clique and its executive organ, the Gochev-Keramidjiev
gang’ had, ‘and still has’, hundreds of Yugoslav intelligence men in Aegean
Macedonia. Time and again, he said, the Greek Central Committee had drawn the
attention of the Yugoslav Central Committee to the counter-revolutionary
actions of these agents, ‘proved by irrefutable documentary evidence’, and had
demanded that their activities should be stopped. The Yugoslav Central
Committee, however, ‘did not do a thing about these provocative actions.’
The point
which Zahariades did not disclose was, of course, the extent to which the Greek
Communist leaders had ever pledged their consent to these Yugoslav activities
in Aegean Macedonia. There is in fact no evidence available about any formal war-time
agreement between the two Communist Parties on the Macedonian question,
although there was quite obviously a working agreement on war-time
collaboration.
On
war-time relations between the Greek and Bulgarian Communist Parties there is
very little reliable evidence. A document was produced towards the end of the
war, known as the Tetrich Agreement’. This purported to be an agreement signed
by Greek and Bulgarian Communists in July 1943, pledging the Greek Communist
Party to co-operate in the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia . The
authenticity of this document was accepted by most non-Communist Greeks but
denied by the Communists. On grounds of general probability, it seems unlikely
that the Greek Communists would have ceded such a vital point to the Bulgarians
at a period of the war when the Bulgarians had very little to offer in
exchange, and when Moscow was presumably known to be backing the Yugoslavs,
rather than the Bulgarians, in Macedonia.
Nationalist
Greeks also accepted the authenticity of the supposed Mount Kaimaxillar
Agreement, by which the Greek Communists were alleged to have agreed to
Macedonian autonomy within a Slav federation.
Finally,
there is the curious character known as Rhodopoulos or Radev who, at the
beginning of 1944, presented himself to the Allied Military Mission in Greece as liaison officer between the Mission and the Greek and
Bulgarian Communists. In September 1944 he reappeared as a Colonel in the
Bulgarian Army, and engineered the Bulgarian army’s sudden change of front in
Greek Macedonia.
It seems a
reasonable guess that although there were undoubtedly war-time
contacts between the Greek and Bulgarian Communist Parties, in the course of
which the Macedonian question must inevitably have been raised, these contacts
were of far less importance than Greek-Yugoslav Communist relations. It seems
in fact probable that during the war the Greek Communist Party managed to avoid
committing itself on the ultimate settlement of the Macedonian question. At the
time of the liberation Professor Svolos, a non-Communist member of E.A.M.,
denied that E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. has any interest in Macedonian autonomy. No
statement was, however, officially made by the Greek Communist Party, as such.
The Greek
civil war of December 1944 led to the flight of a number of Slavo-Macedonians,
and also Greek Communists, to Yugoslav Macedonia. This gave the newspapers of
Skoplje and Belgrade
the occasion for repeated outbursts, from 1945 onwards, about Greek
‘monarcho-Fascist’ persecution of the Slavo-Macedonians. A Soviet spokesman
gave 30,000 as the total of Slavs who had fled from Greece at this period.
Zahariades,
in his article of August 1949, gave a strange interpretation of this flight:
‘Tito organized the mass emigration of Macedonians to Yugoslavia ,
thus depriving Aegean Macedonia of its Macedonian population.’ ‘Incidentally’,
he added, ‘the Greek monarcho-Fascists have been trying to do the same thing
for many years, hoping to change the ethnical composition of Aegean Macedonia.’
Zahariades added that the ‘Tito-ites’ tried to recruit agents from the refugees
who, after the necessary training, were sent to Greece to operate against the Greek
Communist Party.
In March
1949, when relations between the Greek and Yugoslav Parties were nearing an
open break, a delegation from ‘free Greece ’ asked permission to visit
these refugees and help them to return home. This, according to the Greek
account, was refused; probably the Yugoslavs declared that the refugees did not
wish to return.
The Greek
Communist Party, for the first four years after the liberation, did its best to
keep silent on Macedonia .
In the early spring of 1946, Zahariades visited Prague
and Belgrade , and must almost
inevitably have discussed Macedonia
with the Yugoslav Communist leaders. A few months earlier, on 11 October 1945,
Tito had made an uncompromising statement in Skoplje: ‘We have not denied the
right of the Macedonian people to unite. We shall never deny that right. That
is our principle. We do not lay down principles for some passing sympathy. We
shall stand on this aim, that all Macedonians shall be united in their
country.’ Nevertheless, it seems likely that Tito informed Zahariades that the
first priority was that the Greek Communists should win Greece , and
that only after that had been achieved need the Macedonian question be settled.
At all
events Zahariades, when he returned to Athens ,
said in an interview to a British correspondent in May 1946: ‘Territorial
questions between Greece and
Yugoslavia
do not arise.’ He added that the population of Greek Macedonia was 90 per cent
Greek and only 10 per cent Slav, and that E.A.M. stood for the territorial
integrity of Greece .
At that time there was at least no open change in the Greek Party’s Macedonian
policy.
However,
the Greek Communist Party must then already have laid its plans for the new
Greek civil war: these in fact may have been the main subject of Zahariades’s
talks in Belgrade .
On 8 June 1946 the Greek Ministry of Public Order announced that ‘roaming
Communist bands had created a desperate situation in Macedonia ’. By the end of the year
the new guerrilla movement had started operations, led by the Moscow-trained
Greek Communist and former Communist organizer in Macedonia , Markos Vafiades. (Markos
was born in Asia Minor and came to Salonika in 1922; his natural sympathies
would therefore be with the Greek ‘patriotic’ wing, rather than the Macedonian
autonomist wing, of the Greek Communist Party.) On 24 December 1947 the
formation of the ‘Provisional Democratic Government’, headed by Markos, was
proclaimed. The Greek Government in Athens
replied by outlawing the Greek Communist Party.
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