Thursday, June 1, 2017

ХАЛФОРД МАКИНДЕР: Географски стожер на историјата


...Here we have illustrated the essential difference between the Saracen and the Turkish controls of the Nearer East. The Saracens were a branch of the Semitic race, essentially peoples of the Euphrates and Nile and of the smaller cases of Lower Asia. They created a great empire by availing themselves of the two mobilities permitted by their land – that of the horse and camel on the one hand, that of the ship on the other. At different times their fleets controlled both the Mediterranean  as far as Spain, and the Indian ocean to the Malay islands. From their strategically central position between the eastern and western oceans, they attempted the conquest of all the marginal lands of the Old World, imitating Alexander and anticipating Napoleon. They could even threaten the steppe land. Wholly distinct from Arabia as from Europe, India, and China were Turanian pagans from the closed heart of Asia, the Turks who destroyed the Saracen civilization.
Mobility upon the ocean is the natural rival of horse and camel mobility in the heart of the continent. It was upon navigation of oceanic rivers that was based the Potamic stage of civilization, that of China and Yangtse, that of India and Ganges, that of Babylonia on the Euphrates, that on Egypt on Nile. It was essentially upon the navigation of the Mediterranean that was based what has been described as the Thalassic stage of civilization, that of the Greeks and Romans. The Saracens and the Vikings held sway by navigation of the oceanic coasts.
The all-important result of the discovery of the Cape road to the Indies was to connect the western and eastern coastal navigations of Euro-Asia, even though by a circuitous route, and thus in some measure to neutralize the strategical advantage of the central position of the steppe-nomads by pressing on them in rear. The revolution commenced by the great mariners of the Columbian generation endowed Christendom with the wildest possible mobility of power, short of the wing mobility. The one and continuous ocean enveloping the divided and insular lands is, of course, the geographical condition of ultimate unity in the command of the sea, and of the whole theory of modern naval strategy and policy as expounded by such writers as Captain Mahan and Mr. Spencer Wilkinson. The broad political effect was to reverse the relations of Europe and Asia, for whereas in the Middle Ages Europe was caged between an impassable desert to the south, and unknown ocean on the west, and icy of forested wastes to north and north-east, and in the east and south-east was constantly threatened by the superior mobility of the horsemen and camel-men, she now emerged upon the world, multiplying more than thirty-fold the sea surface and coastal lands to which she had access, and wrapping her influence round the Euro-Asiatic land-power which had hitherto threatened her very existence. New Europes were created in the vacant lands discovered in the midst of the waters, and what Britain and Scandinavia to Europe in the earlier times, that have America and Australia, and in some measures even Trans-Saharan Africa, now become to Euro-Asia. Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia, and Japan are now ring of outer and insular bases for sea-power and commerce, inaccessible to the land-power of Euro-Asia.
But the land power still remains, and recent events have again increased its significance. While the maritime peoples of Western Europe have covered the ocean with their fleets, settle the outer continents, and in varying degree made tributary the oceanic margins of Asia, Russia has organized the Cossacks, and, emerging from her northern forests, has policed the steppe by setting her own nomads to meet the Tartar nomads. The Tudor century, which saw the expansion of Western Europe over the sea, also saw Russian power carried from Moscow through Siberia. The eastward swoop of the horsemen across the Asia was an event almost as pregnant with political consequences as was rounding of the Cape, although the two movements long remained apart.
It is probably one of the most striking coincidences of history that the seaward and the landward expansion of Europe should, in a sense, continue the ancient opposition between Romans and Greek. Few great failures have had more far-reaching consequences that the failure of Rome to Latinize  the Greek. The Teuton was civilized and Christianized by the Roman, the Slav in the main by Greek. It was the Graeco-Slav who rode over the steppes, conquering the Turanian. Thus the modern land-power differs from the sea power no less in the source of its ideals than in the material conditions of its mobility.
In the wake of the Cossack, Russia has safely emerged from her former seclusion in the northern forests. Perhaps the change of the greatest intrinsic importance which took place in Europe in the last century was the southward migration of the Russian peasants, so that whereas agricultural settlements formerly ended at the forest boundary, the center of the population of all European Russia now lies to south of that boundary, in the midst of the wheat-fields which have replaced the more western steppes. Odessa has here risen to importance with the rapidity of an American city.
A generation ago steam and the Suez canal appeared to have increased the mobility of the sea-power relatively to land-power. Railways acted chiefly as feeders to ocean-going commerce. But trans-continental railways are now transmuting the conditions of land-power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in closed heart-land of Euro-Asia, in vast areas of which neither timber nor accessible stone was available for road-making. Railways work the greater wonders in the steppe, because they directly replace horse and camel mobility, the road stage of development having here being omitted.
In the matter of commerce it must not be forgotten that ocean-going traffic, however relatively cheap, usually involves the fourfold handling of goods – at the factory of origin, at the export wharf, at the import wharf and in the inland warehouse for retail distribution; whereas the continental railway truck may run direct from the exporting factory to the importing warehouse. Thus marginal ocean-fed commerce tends, other things being equal, to form a zone of penetration round the continents, whose inner limit is roughly marked by the line which the cost of four handlings, the oceanic freight, and the railway fright from the neighbouring coast, is equivalent to the cost of two handlings and the continental railway freight. English and German coals are said to compete on such terms midway through Lombardy.
The Russian railway have a clear run of 6.000 miles from Wirballen in the west to Vladivostok in the east. The Russian army in Manchuria is as significant evidence of mobile land-power as the British army in South Africa was of sea-power. True, that the Trans-Siberian railway is still a single and precarious line of communication, but the century will not be old before all Asia is covered with railways. The space within the Russian empire and Mongolia are so vast, and their potentialities in population, wheat, cotton, fuel, and metals, so incalculably great, that it is inevitable that a vast economic world, more or less apart, will there develop inaccessible to oceanic commerce.
As we consider this rapid review of the broader currents in history, does not certain persistence of geographical relationship become evident? Is not the pivot region of the world politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to horse-riding nomads, and is today about to be covered with network of railways? There have been and are here the conditions of a mobility of military and economic power of a far-reaching and yet limited character. Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India, and on China, replaces the centrifugal raids of the steppe-men. In the world at large she occupies the central strategical position held by Germany in Europe. She can strike on all sides and be struck from all sides, save the north. The full development of her modern railway mobility is merely a matter of time. Nor is it likely that any possible social revolution will alter her essential relations to the great geographical limits of her existence.

(The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23. No. 4 Apr. 1904, 421-437.)

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