Извадок од уводното излагање на претседателот на Чехословачкото историско
друштво професор Вацлав Хуса, дописен член на Чехословачката акедимија на
науките
“On the occasion of the Twentieth
Anniversary of Munich, the Czechoslovak Historical Society, together with Charles University ,
the Historical Institute of Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, and the Institute
for International Politics and Economics, decided to call an international
conference to study the causes and effects of the fateful Munich events of 1938.
The immense complexity of the
historical facts generally grouped under the name of Munich ,
represent in our opinion, one of the basic problems of the present political
history not only in Czechoslovakia ,
but of the world. We believe, therefore, that the analysis of all the historic
connections and causes which finally led to Munich , as well as of its consequences, is an
urgent task for international historiography, and specifically for its more
specialized filed, to study the history of international relations.”
“It seems to us that after a
lapse of twenty years, the time has come for historiographers of various
countries to meet and, in an atmosphere of free scientific discussion, to
exchange the views on the question of Munich .
We are happy that among 25 guests from eleven countries who accepted our
invitation, we have an honor to greet not only eminent representatives of
contemporary historiography and well known experts on international affairs,
but that among them are old friends of Czechoslovakia, who at the same time of
the Munich events, were fully aware of the disastrous consequences of the
policy of the international powers, and actively defended the cause of our
Republic, and the maintenance of the world peace.”
“When stressing that one of the
main purposes of this conference is to contribute to a more profound,
scientific understanding of the historic events which climaxed in the Munich surrender in the
face of the Hitler’s fascism, this does not mean that we are thinking only of
the past. In our view, no one who is concerned with the fate of the mankind can
discuss the Munich
events without thinking at the same time about the present and the future. Munich,
and everything that preceded and followed it, is for us a part of the present,
which cannot be discussed with calm indifference, or without remembering the
tragic consequences that resulted from the surrender to fascist aggression.”
“The extent of Munich betrayal can only be judged in the light
of the developed of the mankind during the past two decades. It is, therefore,
not possible for this conference to pass indifferently and in silence over the
fact that the spirit of Munich is not merely historical fact, but that it still
lives, and that as it did 20 years ago, it is again preparing the way for those
dark forces of history that strive to draw mankind into the abyss of another,
even more disastrous catastrophe that the last war.”
“We trust that a true scientific
analysis of the causes and consequences of Munich will also contribute to the present
world struggle for peace and understanding among nations. If our conference
succeeds in this, it will have accomplished its purpose.”
Prof. Jiri Hajek (Czechoslovakia
(Excerpt from the main address
to the conference)
“…In 1938 a campaign of treats
and intimidation was launched, which was combined with a campaign of slander in
order to turn the sympathies of the people in the European capitalist countries
away from Czechoslovakia. The country was painted not only as prison for the
German minority, but also as a centre of Bolshevism which was alleged to
constitute a threat to the whole of Europe . Anti-Communism,
the main slogan of that propaganda, found considerable response among the
circles of the reactionary bourgeoisie of the Western Powers and in the states
of Central and S.E. Europe. The most effective support for the German policy
for the destruction of Czechoslovakia
came from the Western Powers.”
“The Government and the ruling
circles in Great Britain and
France , throughout 1937 and
1938, directed their policies toward agreement with Germany
and Italy
along the lines of a Four-Power Pact. Lord Halifax’s visit to Hitler in
November 1937 confirmed this very clearly.”
“The supporters of the policy of
agreement with Hitler wished to strengthen the fascist states for the struggle
against USSR and against
Communism in Europe . The reactionary circles
of those countries were comparatively unconcern by the fact that this
assistance in the name of anti-Bolshevism might also prove a threat to France and Great Britain themselves. On the
contrary: they assumed that by directing Hitler’s aggressive tendencies towards
the East, they would relieve the pressure of German imperialism on the
colonies.
“A barrier to the realization of
these plans were existing treaty commitments and the obligations arising from
membership in the League of nations . And since
Czechoslovakia was the first
target to the planned attack, the commitments toward her undertaken by France as a direct ally and by Great Britain as an ally of France and a leading member state of League of Nations , formed an unpleasant and burdensome
obstacle. An attack by Germany
on Czechoslovakia and
resistance of the part of the state would have forced two Great Powers – in the
view of the commitments they had undertaken – into an anti-fascist alliance at
the side of the Soviet Union . The character of
that alliance would undoubtedly have been objectively progressive, and hence,
entirely unacceptable to British and French reaction. The strength of such an
alliance was clear at first glance. It would have obviously led to the defeat
of Hitler. This was assumed with certainty both by Hitler’s generals and
diplomats, particularly at such times when the possibility of the formation of
such alliance appeared real. That was the case in May 1938, and later again in
September 1938. The leading British supporter of Munich
policy Henderson , after discussions with
representatives of the opposition among Hitler’s generals, stated at the end of
August, that if the British went to war against Germany
on account of Czechoslovakia ,
they would defeat Hitler. But all these considerations were mingled with a fear
of the results of victory of the antifascist coalition and the fall of Hitler.”
“The American Ambassador in Paris
Bullitt, in his report to White House of May 22, 1938, gave a warning about the
consequences of a development in the situation leading to France being forced
to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia: ‘There would only be one possible result:
the complete destruction of Western Europe and Bolshevism all over the
continent.’ Chamberlain’s close adviser on matters of foreign policy Sir Horace
Wilson, rejected at the end of August, the very idea that Britain would speak out in defence of Czechoslovakia :
‘The only one to gain from that would be Bolshevism. That has to be prevented.
The right of Germany
to expand in the south-east direction has to be recognized.’ On September 26,
when a clash with Hitler seemed inevitable, and the participation of Britain in
an alliance with France and the Soviet Union become for a short time a real
possibility, Chamberlain said in the course of discussions with Gamelin (quoted
by Jan Masaryc who was present): ‘Who will give me a guarantee that Germany
will not go bolshevik?’ This perspective frightened the ruling circles in London and Paris ,
and forced them to seek a way out of the situation of which they were so
afraid.”
“Those were the motives behind
the attitude of the Western Powers Czechoslovakia in 1938. They led the
governments of those powers to accept a
priori Hitler’s views and proposals on Czechoslovakia as reasonable and
acceptable without further study, without consideration of their consequences,
or even the real prerequisites for their fulfillment.”
“Under those circumstances, the
negotiations with Germany
and Czechoslovakia
had a special, almost grotesque character: the Western Powers let Hitler know
that they were willing to yield to his wishes, which in advance, they
considered reasonable. Then Henlein submitted his demands to the
Czechoslovakian Government. London and Paris recommended, later even ordered, that Prague accept those
demands. Any proposals put forward by Czechoslovakia which Hitler
rejected, were also rejected by the Western Governments even when they had
earlier been approved by their representatives, and in some cases, had been
initiated by them.”
“The Western representatives than
hastened to Munich
without any reservation or reticence (?). They went to carry out a task which
was later characterized by one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Munich
Neville Henderson, in his letter to Lord Halifax of October 6, 1938: ‘to save
Hitler and his regime’. And Czechoslovakia
was sacrificed for the aim of ensuring agreement among the capitalist countries
on the basis of Four-Power Pact. No wonder than, that no one in Munich as much
as gave a thought to Czechoslovakia’s interests, and that delegates summoned at
a large stage to be handed the decision about them, made without them and
against them, were given simply to understand by the representatives of France
and Great Britain that in the European set-up that was to have been established
by the Munich negotiations, and which Chamberlain extolled as bringing ‘peace
for our time’, the was no place for free Czechoslovakia.”
“There seems to be a widespread
view, propagated by numerous publications, to the effects that the USA had nothing to do with a Munich policy of the Western European Powers.
The behavior of the Government and the ruling class of the United States,
however, cannot be considered passive – on the contrary: a number of facts show
that USA, its diplomats and the American monopolies themselves, worked very
actively for Munich and eve inspired its policy. First of all, there is what we
might call the pre-history of Munich: The renewal of German imperialism after
the First World War, carried out in an atmosphere of anti-Soviet intrigues and
line-ups, was only possible thanks to the decisive participation of American
capital.”
“British, German and American
documents moreover, reveal that American participation in the actual
preparation of Munich
was very considerable. The above-mentioned letter written by Ambassador Bullitt
on May 22, in fact contains a very clear conception of Munich and gives its motives. By the side of
Bullitt stood Kennedy, the Ambassador of the US in London, who worked in close
contact with Chamberlain, and the Berlin Ambassador Hugh Wilson, who especially
in August 1938, showed great initiative in support of the Munich policy, trying
to bring direct influence to bear on President Benesh, at time of the Runciman Mission.
The influence of these forces and personalities in American foreign policy was
considerable. It should be realized that Roosevelt himself succumbed to them.
On September 23, as the result of Bullitt’s repeated proposals, the Government
of USA took the initiative in proposing conference of ‘interested states’
excluding the Soviet Union , and issued a peace
appeal to Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Benesh, asking them to continue
peaceful negotiations. This (was) at very time when a conflict would have
overthrown Hitler. In all this, they indiscriminately place the German aggressor
on the same level as threatened Czechoslovakia .
The American President was the first to turn to Mussolini on September 26, with
a request that he use his good offices between Hitler and the West. In this
way, the USA contributed to the diplomatic isolation of Czechoslovakia,
increased pressure on that country and endorsed Mussolini in the role of
‘mediator’ in convening the Munich Conference and in the subsequent
negotiations.
…
Prof. Tushe Vlakhov (Bulgaria):
The penetration of Hitlerism into Bulgaria and the Struggle against the Munich policy and Fascism
...
(LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF
MUNICH – Delivered at the International
Conference on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Munich 1958; ORBIS -Prague 1959)
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