Розмари Колборн Томкинс: Англо-Руските дипломатски односи 1907-1914

Глава VI

БРИТАНИЈА, РУСИЈА И БАЛКАНСКИТЕ ВОЈНИ

In the autumn of 1912 the Balkans exploded, and Europe once more faced international crisis. Russia and England again had to review their commitments to each other through the complexity of European diplomatic relations. The formation of the Balkan league and the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 meant diplomatic involvement for both nations and served to emphasize further their dependence on each other and on the European balance of power.

Although Anglo-Russian friendship was dangerously weak at the end of 1911, both nations sincerely desired a period of tranquility in the Balkans. Britain was increasingly anxious over the unfortunate circumstances of the Ottoman Empire, both because of British commercial interests in the area, and because Britain had no desire to follow a policy which would cause unrest among the vast Moslem population in her colonial possessions. Russia, frustrated in her attempts to open the Straits and to control the events in the Balkans, was also concerned with the cause of peace. Her military and government officials were painfully aware that Russia was still not ready for war. Unlike Britain, however, Russia had vital interests in the Balkans and could not be content to sit back and pass up the opportunity to increase her prestige at the expense of Turkey. In her own eyes, her actions were not designed to bring about war. Russia saw instead her encouragement of Balkan cooperation as a precaution and hoped to introduce an element of stability into potentially volatile situation. In true Russian fashion, her diplomats envisioned themselves guiding the Balkan union, able to control the troublesome states both in the interests of Slavdom and more, and more important, of the Russian Empire. Their mistaken evaluation of their own abilities both frustrated the desires of their British partner and brought Europe to the brink of a general War.

The Tripolitanian War had aroused fears in London and St. Petersburg that the Balkan states might take advantage of Turkey’s difficulties to attack the European provinces. The Balkans had long history of conflict among themselves. Although attempts to establish a league of Balkan states had been made on several previous occasions, they had produced no agreements. On 25 December 1908 Izvolski had made a speech in the Duma in which he openly favored the creation of a Balkan League. Sir Edward Grey would have been happy to demonstrate to his critics some improvement in the Balkans as a result of the Anglo-Russian cooperation there; moreover, in December 1908 Grey probably wished to assure Izvolsky of continued British friendship in spite of the obviously reluctant help offered during the annexation crisis. He therefore responded favorably to the speech and wired the British ambassador in St. Petersburg:

Izvolsky speech seemed to me very satisfactory… I am glad he emphasized the need for a community of feeling between the Balkan states and the combination of all three of them with Turkey for defense of common interest. I am quite in favor of this and will encourage it, whenever I can.

Negotiations for an alliance had actually begun between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1909, but differences in the two countries’ attitudes toward Austria had precluded the agreement. Still another attempt to form a league including Turkey came from Charykov in Constantinople before his retirement. Until 1912 however, the Balkan states had no united policy that would allow them to act against the Ottoman Empire.

Edward Grey would have liked to have seen a revival of Austro-Russian cooperation in the Balkans, because he thought, as the two great powers most intimately involved there, they would be most successful in maintaining peace. English reluctance to become involved in the Balkans again was clearly demonstrated by Arthur Nicolson, who wrote to the British Minster in Sofia “…we have so much on our hands elsewhere, that we have no wish to add to our responsibilities”.

Russia however, had other plans which did not include rapprochement with Austria. Although authorities do not agree on the amount of influence Russia was able to exert on the establishment of the Balkan League, Balkan cooperation certainly had the approval of official Russia and the assistance, both competent and meddlesome, of several Russian diplomats in Balkan countries. Even while Charykov launched his unsuccessful venture to open the Straits and establish a Balkan-Turkish alliance from Constantinople, more successful efforts were underway in other parts of the Balkans.

After 1908 Balkan unity was stimulated not only by a encouragement of Russians, who were interested in recouping the disgrace of the Bosnian annexation, but also by the severe Turkification policy of the Young Turks. The intense nationalism of the Turkish regime resulted in oppression and persecution for the Christian and Slavic population of the Empire, and sporadic revolts occurred throughout the entire Balkans. Revolutionary bands in Macedonia and Albania proved especially persistent, but revolutionary activity occurred in every state, frequently with the approval and cooperation of government officials.

Russian officials renewed steps toward fostering Balkan unity in the spring of 1911, even before Foreign Minister Sazonov went on leave to recuperate from his long illness. The overtures came from Nicholas Hartwig, the Russian Minister to Serbia, who eagerly supported the cause of Slavic interests against Turkey, and who wanted Russian policy to follow his lead. Sazonov had encouraged Hartwig’s actions, but when, in the Foreign Minister’s absence, Hartwig requested permission to meet with Nekliudov in Sofia to renew negotiations toward an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, the Russian Foreign Office refused. Acting Foreign Minister Neratov, always hesitant to act forcefully, could only caution Hartwig that any such negotiations must be carried on in the utmost secrecy, so as not to disturb the European powers. Then, and several times later, Neratov voiced his reluctance to became actively involved in such a plan.

Few other circles in Russia were so apprehensive about Russian participation in forming a Balkan alliance. Some Russian officials thought it might hasten a revolt against Turkey, and despite Russian espousal of the Slavic cause, an ambiguity concerning the status of the Straits was always present in Russian policy. Russia demanded hegemony at the Straits, by whatever means, and it was not always evident that the demise of the Turkish Empire would bring this desire about. Always prompted more by national self-interest than by ideological consideration of Panslavism, the Russian government would not hesitate to cooperate with the Turks to gain their desires. Along the same line, some Russian officials thought that direct Russian military and financial aid might allow Russia greater control of Balkan activities than an alliance. Aid of this sort had proved successful in containing the actions of Montenegro. In any event, Neratov’s warning fell on deaf ears. Hartwig and Nekliudov instead began active encouragement of Balkan unity. Indeed, they were pursuing the line that was most popular in Russia, especially in the press and among the people.

Hartwig’s firm convictions that Russia must support Slavic nations against the Turks and against Austria, and that it was Russia’s destiny to establish control over the Straits, always influenced his actions.

…

(“Anglo-Russian Diplomatic Relations 1907-1914”, THESIS presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State University by Rosemary C. Tomkins; Denton – Тексас, мај 1975)